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Chapter 1
Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine individual-level citizen participation in
the notice and comment component of federal agency rulemaking. Three research
questions are addressed. First, who participates? Previous studies have examined the
role of interest groups (Golden, 1998), the content of comments (Cuèllar, 2005), and
agency procedures in handling comments (Paglin and Shor, 1977; West, 1984; Balla,
1998; Yackee and Yackee, 2006). This study focuses on characteristics of individual
commenters. The second research question is to what extent are these participants
representative of the general public? This is accomplished through a detailed comparison
of notice and comment participants to norms for the general public. The final question is
to what extent the inclusion of these participants in the notice and comment process is
compatible with the democratic ideals of liberty, equality, and fairness?
At the root of these questions lies a conflict of visions of public participation in
the American republic. One vision is representative democracy and it emphasizes public
participation in the electoral process. The other vision is participatory democracy and it
emphasizes direct citizen involvement in government decision-making. While the
resolution of this conflict is beyond the scope of this study, some elaboration of the
controversy is necessary in order to understand the historical foundations of the
contemporary debate on the appropriate role of citizens in what is essentially a legislative
function.
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The delegation of authority to agencies to make rules began in the first
session of Congress when the president was authorized to make rules governing
trade with Indian tribes. Delegation increased rapidly during the later portion of
the Nineteenth Century as Congress faced the challenge of regulating monopolies.
War and economic upheaval further expanded delegation to federal agencies,
boards, and commissions. The explosion of federal rulemaking during the New
Deal nearly triggered a constitutional crisis with Roosevelt's Court Packing plan.
Subsequently, Roosevelt initiated the Brownlow Committee and the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure to study federal rulemaking
and make the process more uniform throughout the agencies. Delayed by World
War II, the result of these deliberations would form the basis of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (Kerwin, 2003).
The requirement for public participation in the notice and comment component of
federal agency rulemaking is authorized in relatively modest language. Congress merely
requires that:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant
matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose (5 U. S. C. §553c,
2006).

From such humble beginnings, seeds of the "participation revolution" (Kerwin, p.
166) found fertile soil. Starling (1982) describes earlier models of public decisionmaking that emphasized a rational process in which the planning of public programs
progressed through a particular progression. Trained professionals planned programs.
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After a problem was identified, alternatives would be determined and evaluated. One
alternative would be selected, a plan of action would be designed, and that plan would be
implemented. Subsequently, a process of feedback and review would determine the need
and nature of changes. Starling noted that this process suffered from two particular
weaknesses. First, planners generally considered too few options. Second, planners
frequently failed to question assumptions.
So, as the flood of delegation of the New Deal heightened public concern about
agency rulemaking, the inclusion of more viewpoints was seen as an improvement in the
decision process. And, Kerwin argues that the development of rules is a crucial avenue
for increased public involvement in the decisions of agencies:

Rulemaking adds opportunities for and dimensions to public participation
that are rarely present in the deliberations of Congress or other
legislatures. It is often difficult for interested parties to determine exactly
what a bill under consideration means to them. The more vague the
proposed provisions, the more difficult it is for the public to decide
whether participation is worth the effort and, if so, what position to take
(p. 31).
In rulemaking the decisions regarding participation become much clearer
because the issues are better defined, the actions government is
contemplating are more specific, and the implications for affected parties
are much easier to predict. Positions are thus easier to formulate and
articulate. And there are many ways for the public to get involved in
rulemaking and to influence the content of rules. The cost of effective
participation in rulemaking may be lower, and the chances of success in
rulemaking greater than those that front the public during legislative
deliberations (pp. 31-2).

Also, Kerwin identifies specific advantages to those most involved the
rulemaking process. He points out that Congress frees itself from the tedium of detail
while indemnifying itself from the squabbles and acrimony frequently experienced in the
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rulemaking process. After the Reagan era reforms requiring the Office of Management
and Budget to review all agency rules, presidents gain substantially more input into the
details of public policy. Jurists, especially those with strong views in particular policy
areas, gain a vehicle for imposing their will on agency operations. State and local
governments get a chance to impact proposed rules in ways that may facilitate subsequent
implementation or preserve state autonomy for a particular policy. Among the ranks of
bureaucrats, policy zealots realize increased policy influence. And, of course, interest
groups that already enjoy a strong influence in the debates of Congress gain an additional
opportunity to influence agency deliberations.
And, as might be expected, those left out of the direct benefits are the first to
complain. With the crush of interstate highway construction, and massive urban renewal
projects during the 1950s and 1960s, public reaction to government policy-making was
negative, especially among the disadvantaged (Wamsley et al 1990). A belief that
participation would empower the unrepresented fueled the drive to expand the voice of
the public in agency decision-making (Kerwin). Congress responded by requiring
increased public participation in new programs, including a short-lived flirtation with
maximum feasible participation in urban economic development programs (Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964). Also, Congress enhanced the role of stakeholders in many
Great Society and subsequent laws (Kerwin). While this may have turned the attention of
protesters away from Congress in the short term, public administrators increasingly
became the whipping boys of both liberals who wanted more and conservatives who
wanted less from government programs (Wamsley et al).
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A movement within the field of public administration sought to remedy these
negative images and sought to move public administration from its traditional grounding
in scientific management and progressivism to a more democratic grounding upon public
interest and citizen participation. Among the key goals of this Refounding Movement are
a commitment to greater social equity, a concern for wider participation, and a critical
outlook toward the shortcomings of logical positivism and pluralism (Wamsley et al). In
their "Blacksburg Manifesto" (Wamsley et al, p. 6), these proponents of "The Public
Administration" (p.34) claim a constitutional basis for the legitimacy of administration,
independent of elected representatives.
The Public Administration as an institution of government has as valid a
claim to being representative of the people in both a sociological and
functional sense as a federal judge appointed for life, a freshman
congressman narrowly elected by a small percentage of the citizens in
southeast Nebraska or a senator from Rhode Island. For that matter, The
Public Administration may be as representative of the people as a whole as
a president elected by a coalition of voting blocs and interest groups
claiming victory based on less than 51 percent of the popular vote and
29.9 percent of the eligible voters, which in turn is approximately 19
percent of the total populace (pp.46-47).

Also, they assert an ability to understand the public interest and act on it in a
fashion superior to mere elected officials who are under the influence of special interests.
The source of this new and extra-constitutional legitimacy and understanding is the direct
involvement of agency clients in the process of governance (Wamsley et al). But their
faith may not be supported by historical evidence. At the root of the Refounding
Movement's infatuation with direct citizen involvement in the legislative process is a
flawed model of direct democracy that has been handed down to us through the ages in
highly romanticized accounts of Athenian democracy. It is the image of radicalized
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citizen participation transmitted through the classics that sets what has become a standard
for democracy in future generations (Saxonhouse, 1993). However, archeological
evidence challenges the actual level of participation achieved by these most worthy and
revered democrats of Athens. Modern studies of the seating capacity of the Pynx, the
meeting place of the Athenian assembly, indicate that no more than one-third of the
eligible citizens could have attended any meeting. This would tend to undermine theories
of the ubiquity of Athenian participation, especially when one considers the complete
exclusion of women, slaves, and a relatively large immigrant community (Saxonhouse).
Perhaps the Refounding Movement would be nothing more than an historical
aside were it not for its impact on a small and rather elite group of American academics.
Although there are relatively few professors of public administration in the nation's elite
colleges, this particular set of academics mold the minds of many top-level, as well as the
rank and file, state and federal agency managers. This public management core has
historically exerted a strong and undemocratic influence on the entire process of
governance. Heclo (2002) would label this undemocratic influence "administrative
stewardship" and argue that it is "a calling to take care for the wellbeing of the public
household" (p. 692) in spite of short sighted demands of politicians and citizens. In the
arena of agency rulemaking, administrative stewardship is especially critical. Surrounded
as they are by the most interested parties, it is only the watchfulness of the bureaucrat that
protects the interests of the lambs from the avarice of the lions. To the extent that more
democratic influence, meaning direct public involvement, is induced into the system, less
stewardship is possible.
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American's fascination with that form of democracy requiring direct public
involvement in policy making would have shocked and dismayed the Framers of the
Constitution. Delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 held a fundamental
distrust of direct democracy. In Federalist # 10, Madison paints a dire portrait of what he
describes as the popular governments of earlier periods.
... such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as
they have been violent in their deaths (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, 1966,
p. 81).

Madison describes the protection of property as the primary purpose of
government. He contends that the greatest danger of popular government is its inability
to control the avarice of groups desiring to use the power of government to achieve selfinterested goals. He calls these narrowly interested groups factions.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community (p.
78).
The Framers wanted a government that would be sensitive to the will of the
people. But, equally important, they wanted a government that would protect individual
rights, especially property rights. Also, they wanted a government that would last. So,
when formulating plans for the government of the American empire, Madison and his
colleagues sought to differentiate between those turbulent direct democracies like Athens
and the more stable republican forms like Rome.
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The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic
are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number
of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens,
and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended (p.
82).

These differences, representation and a large republic, formed two of the pillars of
Madison's plan to protect liberty. Truman (1951) argues that Madison’s dependence on
the extent of the union for making the mischief of factions more difficult has been
effectively overcome by improved transportation and communications. While it may be
true that advances in travel and communications have facilitated interest group
interaction, Truman also stipulates that economic forces drive the formation of
associations. Since a larger republic would offer greater opportunities for diversity of
interests and richer societies tend to have more interest groups, diversity and
multiplication of interests might tend to impair the formation of a permanent majority
faction, a beast that Madison describes as the true enemy of liberty.
Likewise, Madison's reasoning for a representative government retains great
merit.
The effect of [representation] is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country,
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it
to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may
well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the
people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by
the people themselves, convened for the purpose (Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay, p. 82).

Economic interests are not inherently factious. However, they act factiously
when given the opportunity to judge their own cases and advance their partial interests.
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Madison counted on the moderating influence of political compromise to control these
interests (Cary, 1994). But, the Framers were not utopian dreamers. They saw selfinterest as the bedrock of the American regime. Public virtue would be rare and the
private sector would dominate the public sector (Richardson and Nigro, 1987). So, the
federal Constitution sets relatively low expectations for public involvement, focused
primarily on the process of electing representatives to express the will of the people. It
does not provide any specific process or institution for direct citizen involvement in
lawmaking, where interests might act factiously if given the opportunity to judge their
own case (Cary). Although a strong advocate of greater citizen participation, Stivers
acknowledges that:
The system's original intent was to leave citizens free to pursue their
private interests, having entrusted the public good to a structure that
filtered and refined citizen views to produce government both 'adequate to
the exigencies' that would ensue and protective of individual liberty
(Wamsley et al, p. 248).

Madison recognizes self-interest as problem in representative democracy,
especially because of the susceptibility of the people's representatives to the enticements
of interest.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to
be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not
indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of
large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators
but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? (Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay, p. 79)

10
Madison realized that the forces of factions could not be eliminated without
ending the liberty of the people. Likewise, he understood that "...the resolution of these
various and interfering interests..." (p.79) is a primary responsibility of any legislative
body. Diamond (1959) points out that the achievement of the goals of narrow interests
from time to time would be essential for the survival of the republic. Further,
achievement would be most important for the more disadvantaged because they would
always be more numerous than the rich. By providing at least the possibility of all
interests achieving their goals in some cases, America might avoid the violent class
struggles experienced by those societies based on permanent classes of winners and
losers.

The fledgling republic could not rely on the virtue or nobility of a ruling elite to
resolve factional conflicts. The pool of virtuous candidates would be shallow, even in a
large republic, and the forces of interest would be strong. In the normal case, where the
faction comprised less than a majority, Madison asserted that the diversity of interests of
a large nation combined with the filtering effects of representation would suffice to hold
factional excesses in control.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views
by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the
society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the
forms of the Constitution. (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, p. 80)

But, the republic would not always be so fortunate. In some cases, interests
would combine to achieve control of the people's representative body and private rights
would be in danger. The first line of defense would be found in limiting the powers of
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the national government. In Federalist #41, Madison describes national powers as limited
to those specifically enumerated. This enumeration served to circumscribe the reach of
government authority. Then, in Federalist #51, he goes on describe how "contriving the
interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places " (Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay, p. 320).
First, the constitution divides power between the national and state governments.
Then, it divides national power between three branches, each with the motive and
resources to defend itself from the others. Finally, it divides the power of the legislature,
that branch, which the Framers considered the most dangerous, into two bodies with
different terms of office and methods of selection, each capable of blocking the action of
the other (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay).
In simpler terms, the Framers of the American Constitution did what they could to
arrange structures, some of which were quite undemocratic, to control the passions
characteristic of democracy. Subsequently, electoral majorities and the politicians who
depend on their support have undone much of this handiwork, and the courts have
undermined the remainder. Visiting the United States only a generation after the writing
of the Constitution, Tocqueville (1990) observed the unstoppable nature of the
democratic majority.
The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute
sovereignty of the majority; for there is nothing in democratic states that is
capable of resisting it (p. 254). The majority in that country [the United
States], therefore, exercise a prodigious actual authority, and a power of
opinion which is nearly as great; no obstacles exist which can impede or
even retard its progress, so as to make it heed the complaints of those
whom it crushes upon its path. This state of things is harmful in itself and
dangerous for the future (p. 256).
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As America transformed itself from an agrarian to an industrial and then an
information society, constitutional provisions originally designed to limit the power of
the majority have been altered through amendment, interpretation, and practice. Our
complex economy and the regulatory state are facts of modern life, not mere alternatives
in a normative argument. Viewed in this light, the requirement for direct public
involvement in agency rulemaking in the Administrative Procedure Act is nothing more
than a continuation of the intrusion of democratic influence into an area that was
deliberately designed to work outside the glare of the public spotlight. By opening the
doors of federal agencies to the public, there may be more sunshine in the decisionmaking process, but what does this new light reveal for the future of our American
republic? When we read the words written by participants in the notice and comment
process, do we hear the heavenly chorus of liberty, equality, and fairness in the voice of
the people, or do we instead hear, as Herring (1936) has suggested, "...the squeal of pigs
at the trough" (p. 3).
From this historical perspective, this study proceeds to a more detailed
investigation of the participants and the process. First, existing theories of factors driving
public participation are examined. Next, the details of the research methodology are
explained and hypotheses based on those theories are stated. Then, data revealing actual
patterns of participation are used to test hypotheses. Also, descriptive data not used in
hypothesis testing are presented to paint a more complete picture of the citizen
participant. In the final chapter, this study concludes by evaluating findings on public
participation in agency rulemaking according to the standards of liberty, equality, and
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fairness. In addition, several proposed reforms are critiqued in light of the data
presented.
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Chapter 2
Citizen Participation

Ironically, group involvement with government has exploded at the same
time that citizen involvement with both government and groups has
diminished (Putnam, 2000, p. 52).

In the previous chapter, the historical foundations of the contemporary dialogue
on public participation in federal agency rulemaking are elaborated. This chapter first
investigates theories on the drivers of political participation. Since the notice and
comment process is political and participation in it is voluntary, it is expected that
theories explaining participation in other forms of political activity will be applicable to
this form of political activity. Next, theories concerning the nature, necessity, and
consequences of public participation in agency rulemaking are examined. Although not
used in hypothesis testing, these theories are useful in evaluating the compatibility of
citizen participation with the democratic values of liberty, equality, and fairness.

Drivers of Political Participation

Research into political participation has routinely stressed the role of
socioeconomic status, especially on low-cost activities such as voting (Gosnell, 1942;
Lazarsfield, 1944; Key, 1950; Lipset, 1960; Lijphart, 1997). Socioeconomic variables
include wealth, education, race, and gender (Verba and Nie, 1972). Age and marital
status may be included, depending the measure of wealth. The age variable proves to be
a problem because income is often used as a surrogate for wealth. People begin their
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productive years earning less than they will in their more productive midlife. However,
after retirement, income drops. So, the relationship of income to age is non-linear. When
the measure of wealth looks at net worth, we see that persons reaching retirement age
have had the opportunity to accumulate sizeable equity and savings. Even those less
fortunate have whatever they have accumulated plus they achieve a retirement income
without the expense of earning it, as well as the bonus of free medical care. It is
reasonable to assume that if all assets are included in a measure of socioeconomic status,
persons reaching retirement age may have substantially more wealth than their retirement
incomes suggest.
But, the association between age and wealth may not be the most important
reason for a strong role for age in predicting political participation. Putnam attributes
about half of the decline in political participation over the last half-century to
generational change. For members of the Great Generation, the Great Depression and
World War II created shared adversity and a shared enemy, leading to a spirit of
patriotism and civic engagement. Because both depression and world war are deviations
from normal day-to-day life, the level of engagement from which Putnam claims we have
fallen may also be an anomaly. Even so, it is an anomaly that has shaped the lives and
expectations of subsequent generations. Putnam finds that Baby Boomers, children of the
Great Generation, have tended to place greater emphasis on individualism than traditional
social roles. Compared to their parents, they are slower to marry and quicker to divorce.
Since a substantial percentage of married persons earn two incomes, lower rates of
marriage would tend to diminish the accumulation of wealth.
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Drawing on the 1990 Citizen Participation Study which deliberately over-sampled
political activists, Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (1993) establish an important link
between income, policy preference, and political influence. Although expressing political
attitudes similar to low income respondents, political activists were found to be less
dependent on social welfare programs, leading them to express different policy
preferences. Since non-activists participate in the political system at lower levels and less
frequently than activists, the policy preferences of the disadvantaged are less likely to be
heard. These findings reinforce earlier research indicating the overrepresentation of the
advantaged in the public policy arena (Schattschneider, 1960; Schlozman, 1984;
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1990).
Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie conclude that:

Our analysis has shown that although similar in their preferences as
measured by standard NES attitude questions, citizens who are active are
quite different in their demographic attributes, their economic needs, and
the government benefits they receive. These disparities are exacerbated
when we move from the most common political act, voting, to acts that are
more difficult, convey more information, and exert greater pressure (pp.
313-4).

Leighley (1995) offers two rival models for explaining the impact of
socioeconomic status on political participation. In the first, the socioeconomic status
model of participation assumes that attitudes precede behavior. Thus, our attitudes,
determined by the social and economic circumstances of our daily lives, determine our
propensity for political participation. In the second, the mobilization model stresses the
importance of political opportunities that may be a determined by the individual's
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environment. Of course, those with higher social and economic status would tend to have
more opportunities, but, not necessarily, all of the opportunities.
In order to take advantage of an opportunity, one must know that the opportunity
exists. This necessity points to a strong role of the media in making political information
available. Putnam finds a strong association between reading newspapers and measures
of citizenship. However, reading newspapers is declining as a result of generational
succession. Those who read newspapers are more likely to participate in political
activities and they are more likely to watch news programs on television. Ranney (1983)
argues that television has replaced the role of the local political opinion leader in
informing the public about politics. Viewers passively absorb some political information,
even when they do not seek it. Similarly, Popkin (1991) finds that the media help shape
voters’ limited knowledge of the world, providing links between issues and offices,
public policy and outcomes. These factors influence a voter’s frame of reference. He
describes the voter as a reasoning investor in collective goods using costly and imperfect
information under conditions of uncertainty. Gains or losses are long term and are not
easily calculated. So, citizens invest little in the acquisition of political information,
relying on "gut reasoning" (p. 7) to process information from daily life, including that
reaching them passively through their normal television viewing.
In spite of the importance of the media in disseminating political information,
both Ranney and Putnam see an important downside, especially to watching television.
Ranney finds that the intensity of television coverage of elections has the unintended
consequence of overloading viewers with political information. The inundation of the
potential voter with a superabundance of information about all campaigns results in
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diminishing the importance of any particular campaign and, thus, trivializing the impetus
for going to the polls. Also, Ranney observes that the increase in time spent watching
television absorbs time that may have been spent in other activities. Putnam is more
specific. For each additional hour spent watching television each day, he predicts a
decline of ten percent in civic activity.
The Internet has the potential to be a rich source of political information,
especially information about proposed federal agency rules. Internet advocates claim that
reducing the cost of acquiring political information via the Internet would increase
political participation. Putnam finds that when controlled for education, Internet users
demonstrate average levels of social engagement, which is highly associated with
political participation. Looking at voting and campaign-related participation, Bimber
(2001) finds no significant association between Internet use and various low-cost types of
involvement. But, he finds that Internet usage is the strongest significant predictor for
higher-cost political activities such as making contributions of money.
Another and more traditional source of political information is a political
association. Putnam observes that cooperative forms of citizen participation have
declined more rapidly than expressive forms. Cooperative forms might include getting
involved in a political campaign to influence an issue. Expressive forms might include
signing a petition or sending an electronic comment on a proposed federal agency rule.
The decline in grass roots politics is a reflection of this trend. Financial capital has
replaced social capital in American elections. Among younger Americans who do
participate, Putnam finds a strong link between civic and political activity.
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But, the link between social capital and political participation may be more
complex. Bowman and Boynton (1966) find a strong influence of primary groups, not
associations, on the recruitment of British political party leaders. Rosenstone and Hansen
find little relationship between participation in non-political and political associations,
possibly because of the treatment of religious groups, which Putnam describes as unlikely
to engage in political activity. However, they concur that voluntary political associations
are critical in mobilizing individuals to take political action. Ayala (2000) points out a
distinction between the impact of voluntary and involuntary associations on political
participation. Acknowledging the importance of voluntary associations, he disputes the
benefit of involuntary associations, such as those encountered in the workplace.
Membership in labor unions may be legally required for employment in closed-shop
states and company culture may exert a similar non-voluntary aspect for low-level
managers' participation in corporate political action committees. Thus, these forms of
participation may serve to replace rather than enhance traditional political mobilization.
Just as Putnam argues that association begets participation, Dahl (1989) argues
that political participation begets political participation. He divides the American public
into two political species. He calls those focused on their private activities Homo Civicus
and those tending toward greater political participation Homo Politicus. Homo Civicus
generally avoids political involvement until threatened by particular actions or inactions
of government. The choices of Homo Civicus are swayed by inertia, habit, unexamined
loyalties, emotions, and impulse. When aroused, she uses political resources to achieve
limited objectives. When the threat is removed, she reverts to her more characteristic
apolitical style. On the other hand, Homo Politicus stalks the political jungle, using
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resources to gain influence that may be converted back to resources. Although only a
small minority, Homo Politicus is far more calculating than his apolitical cousin and uses
his cunning to exploit politically profitable issues. Dahl's (1989) pluralist paradigm
predicts that the most active political participants will use the expectation of benefits or
deprivations as tools to forge individual interests into winning political coalitions that
operate within the legal and constitutional framework of the existing order and use
democratic forms.
Guterbock and London (1983) find that high political trust and efficacy indicate a
politically integrated individual who tends toward normal level of political participation.
However, high trust and low efficacy predict political impotency. Low trust combined
with low efficacy is indicative of alienation, while low trust and high efficacy indicate the
environment of ethnic politics. Ethnic groups are similar to advocates of single issues in
that they may see themselves isolated from the broader political culture that does not
share their particular issue concerns. If this is true, high efficacy and low trust would be
descriptive of participants in the notice and comment process.
Creig, Niemi, and Silver (1990) point out the difficulties involved in separating
the belief that oneself is competent to address political issues, called internal efficacy,
from the belief that the political system is responsive to citizen demands, which is called
external efficacy. Likewise, there are problems inherent in distinguishing between trust
in the incumbents in public office and trust in the basic institutions of government.
Creig, Niemi, and Silver find that typical respondents to the National Election Study are
relatively strong in internal efficacy and that trust in government institutions remains firm
in spite of respondents' distrust of incumbent political leaders.
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Putnam finds a link between the trust, efficacy and social capital. Overall, his
data indicates that American social capital is in decline. From bowling leagues to
Kiwanis Clubs to Boy Scout Troops, a smaller proportion of Americans participate in
civic activities than did sixty years ago. Lower levels of civic activity lead to less contact
among the citizens of a polity. This is a problem because frequent interaction among a
diverse set of people is associated with the norm of generalized reciprocity. Generalized
reciprocity is an indication of trust and the experience of interaction in an environment of
trust increases efficacy and civic engagement as evidenced by continued interaction in
associational activities. Likewise, Kwak, Shah, and Holbert (2004) find that trust in
others facilitates the extension of social activities into civic participation. Brehm and
Rahn (1997) also find a significant role for trust as a driver of participation, but stress the
importance of cognitive abilities, economic resources, and general life satisfaction of the
potential citizen participant.

Participation in the Notice and Comment Process

While the general subject of political participation has received much attention
over the years, surprisingly little empirical research has been focused on citizen
participation in the notice and comment process. Yackee and Yackee find that although
the notice and comment process may have lowered the cost of participation in federal
rulemaking, the costs remain sufficiently high to inhibit the participation of individuals
and public interest groups. Agencies are more likely to alter rules to comply with
business comments than with the comments of other kinds of interests. Business interests
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have greater financial resources allowing advantages in technical and legal expertise.
Therefore, business interests make more comments and more of their comments affect
rules. Similarly, Golden finds an excessive influence of business interests among notice
and comment participants, operating in definable issue networks. She finds that these
business interests enter and exit the policy arena as the focus of rulemaking activity
changes.
Cuèllar describes current methods of citizen participation as a compromise
between aspirations for greater public involvement and the reality of citizen apathy, a
complex regulatory environment, powerful interest groups, and a constrained
bureaucracy. Examining the content of participant comments, he finds that there are
dramatic differences in the level of technical expertise displayed in the comments of
individuals and those of organized interests. However, the comments of organized
interests do not contain the range of concerns expressed by individuals. Cuèllar argues
that while comments may signal the intensity of preferences, the failure to make a
comment does not necessarily imply a lack of concern.
While searching for evidence of deck stacking by administrative agencies in
support of constituencies favored by Congress, Balla had to examine how agencies
process information from comments. In their treatment of comments made on a proposed
rule concerning payment schedules for medical services, with comments made primarily
by physicians and physician associations, the agency differentiates between those
comments made by individual practitioners and those made by associations. Comments
are sorted, filed, and analyzed separately, even though many, if not all, practitioners are
also members of those organizations making comments. Similarly, Cuèllar observes that
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agencies keep a count of all comments, even those that are obviously form letters
initiated, and sometimes executed, by interest groups that make no effort to disguise their
identity. Dryly, he concludes that numbers count.
From a vantage point at the advent of the Internet revolution, Fiorino (1990) finds
difficult barriers to public participation embedded in the institutions of government. He
points to the issue of communicating technically complex material to the lay public in
order to acquire their comments. The process appears inherently biased against the lay
public, which generally lacks the technical expertise necessary to fully understand the
issues presented and make rational comments. Fiorino concludes that low political
awareness and lack of interest on the part of the public are really signs of deficiencies in
institutions, not limitations on the public.
However, over the past two decades, advances in computer technology and
Internet access have allowed government agencies to dramatically increase the
opportunities for public participation. In an examination of state, local, and national
government use of Internet technology, Darrell West (2004) describes the impact of egovernment initiatives as potentially transformative but still developing. Governments
tend to go through progressive stages in their transformation to e-government. Initially,
the government or agency web site serves as a billboard to advertise particular
information selected by the originator. Gradually, options for some forms of limited
service delivery are added. Later, agency web pages become portals, offering fully
executable services and integrating offerings of various agencies or levels of government.
In the final stage, governments facilitate interactive democracy with a variety of offerings
including: e-mail; push technology to alert interested citizens to particular activities;
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postings for comments and complaints; chat rooms, search features; options for the
personalization of the web site; and, broadcasting government events. Although more
than half of Americans claim to have used a federal government web site, Darrell West
(2004) found no significant relationship between such use and trust in government or
assessments of government efficiency.
An audit by the U. S. General Accounting Office (2003) finds that about twothirds of federal agency web sites allow citizens to make electronic comments on
proposed rules. An overlay web site (regulations.gov) is available to facilitate comments
on most other proposed rules. Although noting numerous opportunities for improvement,
the report optimistically forecasts that information technology could greatly facilitate the
public's ability to make comments on proposed rules.
Electronic rulemaking is a prominent element of Bill Clinton's National
Performance Review. Likewise, George W. Bush has emphasized using electronic
rulemaking to create a more citizen-centered government. Most interest groups report
using it, but they rate it as less effective than other avenues of influence (Kerwin). As a
means of increasing effectiveness, some groups have turned to a novel technology.
Emery and Emery (2005) find that some interest groups have developed software to take
the salient points of their argument and disguise them in thousands of faux comments
made in the names of association members, giving the impression of a groundswell of
public support for the groups position. As a countermeasure reminiscent of Cold War era
spy versus spy thrillers, Emery and Emery recommend the development of agency
software to scan all comments and identify main themes. This would improve efficiency
and assure the inclusion of important issues.
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In spite of government's efforts to increase the transparency of its processes and
facilitate public participation, the trend in American public opinion has been a decline in
levels of confidence in the federal government. Brooks and Cheng (2001) find only a
small relationship between confidence in government and policy preferences, suggesting
a crisis of legitimacy. Based primarily on normative arguments, much of the recent
scholarship in this area supports efforts to increase public participation in government
decision-making in order to enhance legitimacy (Rosenbaum, 1976; Langton, 1978;
Fiorino; Wamsley et al; Dahl, 1994; Richardson, 1997; McAvoy, 1999; Lovan, Murray,
and Shaffer, 2004).

Is It Public Participation Or Special Interest Politics?

Lowi (1969) argues that exactly the opposite result is achieved. Agency
rulemaking moves policy making from politically accountable representatives of the
people and resides it in a bureaucracy, arguably accountable to Congress, the courts, and
the president (Meier, 1993; Peters, 2001). Mashaw (1985) makes the point that such
delegation of authority is, in itself, neither inappropriate constitutionally nor unattractive
as an option in deciding policies with more than two possible alternatives. But, when the
participation of stakeholders in agency decisions is mandated, Lowi argues that the power
to make public policy is parceled out to the most interested parties. At that point, the
ends of government and the justification of selecting one policy over another are no
longer matters of public debate. Cynicism and distrust of the political system result.
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This undermines the credibility of incumbent policy-makers (Creig, Niemi, and Silver),
and may ultimately undermine the legitimacy of government institutions (Easton, 1974).
Lowi claims that direct interest group participation in policy has been accepted as
self-government. By allowing groups to work out their own compromises, politicians
avoid conflict. This creates the appearance that government does not have to be coercive.
The primary requirement for fairness is accessibility of the system to all organized
interests, with no judgment of their claims. Public interest is merely the aggregation of
the claims of various interest groups. This system is based on three assumptions. First,
interest groups are homogeneous, easily defined, and accurately represented by their
leadership. Second, interest groups are ubiquitous and tend to balance other interest
groups. And third, government’s role is to assure access and ratify agreements among
contenders (Lowi).
The pluralist notion of politics focuses on the competition of various coalitions for
public support, with the sum of these outcomes expressing the public interest. But, why
should the aggregation of any particular set of interests expressed through winning
coalitions necessarily be the public interest? Schattschneider defines the public interest
as a general interest shared by substantially all members of a society. The sum of the
interests of a set of winning political coalitions specifically excludes the interests of nonwinning coalitions. Likewise, it excludes the interests of the majority of citizens who are
non-participants in this or that political turmoil. Thus, pluralism results not in the public
interest, but in some specific, if temporary, aggregation of special interests.
Schattschneider defines a special interest as that interest shared by only a fraction of a
society. He notes that members of special interests exclude others and their interests may
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be adverse to others’ interest. However, special interests tend to rationalize their interests
as public interests, and, in their public discourses, they state their interests in public
terms.
Contrasting the American pressure system to that of other nations, Black and
Burke (1983) argue that America has progressed into a post-pluralist system. Rather than
a pluralist competition among groups, they find something resembling a European
corporatist model. They observe that many professional groups are granted virtually
exclusive control of their policy areas. The American Medical Association is specifically
named as one such group and the American Bar Association might be another. Often,
these groups exercise a veto power over public policy proposals that might threaten their
group interests.
Likewise, Schlozman argues that, in terms of number and structure, business
interests are over-represented in the American pressure system. A utopian scheme for
political equality would require that all citizens be equally active on all issues. However,
individuals vary in political resources such as time, money, skills, and contacts.
Therefore, differences in rates of participation occur which do not represent differences
in intensity of preferences. She asserts that this overrepresentation of business comes at
the expense of groups representing broad public interests and the poor. She uses census
data to demonstrate that the number of interest groups by type does not match the
percentage of the population she assigns to those interests. Schlozman qualifies the
charge of bias with the recognition that many powerful segments of the population such
as mature, white males are not represented as separate interests.
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Similarly, Schlozman notes that the explosion in the growth of public interest
groups has been offset by the growth of professional associations and individual
corporations as interest groups. Also, business and professional groups tend to last
longer than public interest groups. There has been a decline in the number of civic and
foreign policy interest groups and an increase in environmental and consumer groups.
The stability in the number of union groups as other groups have increased nets a
decrease in the influence of unions. Although the units of the pressure system do not
have equal influence, the advantage of business in number is augmented by its control of
greater resources.
But the multiplicity of voices from the business community may be less of a
chorus than a cacophony. Fritschler (1989) observes that one reason for the involvement
of business in so much of agency decision-making is that most government regulation has
come at the behest of those businesses being regulated. Regulation provides a stability
that is generally lacking in the market. Also, Mancur Olson (1965) points out that
business lobbies are organized by industry, producing a number of small, oligarchic units
that may effectively lobby for issues affecting their particular fiefdom. While small
pressure groups tend to exert greater policy influence because of their ability to organize
effectively and control the distribution of rewards, business has limited influence on
broad national concerns. This is because business, as a whole, is not well organized.
During the past sixty years, Congress has delegated more rulemaking power to
executive agencies and provided for greater public information and public access to the
rulemaking process. Beginning with the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,
Congress has expanded opportunities through the Freedom of Information Act, the
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Privacy Act, the Government In the Sunshine Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act,.
One result of these efforts has been the growth of interest groups, especially those
centered in Washington, D. C. and focused on influencing agency rulemaking (Kerwin).
Both Schlozman and Putnam observe the trend of new membership organizations to be
centered in the nation's capitol. Schlozman notes that many Washington-based pressure
groups have no individual members. Putnam estimates that more than half of modern
associations are professionally staffed advocacy groups with no individual members. In a
study of nature advocacy organizations, Basso (2003) observes:
The professional advocacy organizations that operate in the national and
international policy arenas are not really looking for activist members in
the classical sense, nor would they know what to do with these people if
they had them. It may be cynical to say so, but of what use are 'members'
when lawyers, scientists, and policy experts are far more valuable in dayto-day policy debates at the national and international levels of discourse?
The emergence of 'virtual membership' via the Internet only reinforces the
perspective that members as such are little more than organizational
wallpaper, a collective backdrop for professional advocacy (p. 410).

Associations calling themselves citizen's groups tend to be mere mailing list
organizations, with the membership function limited to making contributions. Putnam
describes the modern mailing list groups as tertiary organizations in which members may
share common ideals and symbols without developing ties to each other. Movements
based on symbolic identification rather than personal networks tend to experience high
membership volatility. These members are principally recruited through direct mail.
Commitment is low, members participate in fewer activities, and recruits hold more
extreme and intolerant political views than members of movements that rely on social
networks.
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Is Participation an Expression of Self-Interest or Symbolic Interest, and Does It
Matter?

When the Founders of the American republic designed a government based on the
realities of human nature, they expected that the greatest proportion of citizens would
pursue their self-interest, giving only infrequent attention to public matters (Richardson
and Nigro). While virtuous activity is an essential part of the good life, political
participation is not essential to virtuous activity. Family and friendships provide ample
opportunities to develop and express virtuosity. So, while government might need the
virtuous citizen's participation to function properly, the virtuous citizen does not need
opportunities to participate in government (Mulgan, 1990). In the early days of the
republic, government was small and most problems were resolved by those most directly
affected, without recourse to politicians or agencies. During his visit to America in the
1830s, Tocqueville observed:

The citizen of the United States is taught from infancy to rely upon his
own exertions in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life; he
looks upon the social authority with an eye of mistrust and anxiety, and he
claims its assistance only when he is unable to do without it. ... The same
spirit pervades every act of social life. If a stoppage occurs in a
thoroughfare and the circulation of vehicles is hindered, the neighbors
immediately form themselves into a deliberative body; and this
extemporaneous assembly gives rise to an executive power which
remedies the inconvenience before anybody has thought of recurring to a
pre-existing authority superior to that of the persons immediately
concerned (p. 191).
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Of course, the problems faced by contemporary Americans are much more
complex than getting a wagon out of a ditch. But, the same self-interest that moved
society from self-reliance toward a complex administrative state in the 1930s appears to
be pushing us in another direction today. Weissberg (2003) attributes the current trend
toward privatization, which tends to diminish the public sphere, to the public's perception
that public and private strategies for handling problems may be interchangeable:
Unlike academics preoccupied with heightened civic activism, ordinary
citizens have long grasped the fungibility of private and collective
strategies. It's purely a matter of practical circumstances - if noisy rallies
to secure improved police protection fail, hire private guards or buy a gun.
In fact, a personalized 'do-it-yourself' solution is quite reasonable given a
gridlocked system in which even simple policy changes may take years
and require assembling unwieldy coalitions (p. 387).

So, political participation is not merely a choice of acting or not acting. It also
represents an individual's choice of a political act over other potential non-political acts.
Putnam finds that, in spite of the general decline in associations, self-help groups are on
the rise. He notes that self-help groups are the only type of groups that are not associated
with higher levels of social capital. Perhaps this is because self-help group members are
acting privately on matters that they consider important to their interests, rather than
waiting for an association to move government to solve their problem. Making a
comment to a proposed agency rule would be an example of choosing a political act to
solve a problem, perhaps even the same kind of problem addressed by other citizens
through self-help groups. Citizens are more likely to participate in political acts when the
interest of the community is demonstrably linked to the interest of the individual
(Leighley ; Burtt,1993; Richardson).
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But not all research points toward such rational choice explanations of
participation. Whiteley (1995) finds that while rational choice theory explains low-cost
activities like voting, expressive concerns and a sense of collective efficacy are the most
significant influence in explaining high-cost activities, like campaigning. Similarly, in an
extensive study of political activists, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1995) find
expressive concerns to be the primary driver of most types of political participation.
The debate over self-interest and expressive motivations of political participation
has produced substantial controversy among academics, culminating in a series of articles
and answers between the spokesmen of the opposing views, each challenging the
methodology of the other. Writing for the proponents of expressive concerns, which he
terms the symbolic politics view, Davis Sears (1997) notes that experimental studies of
the impact of self-interest on decision-making have usually resulted in stronger
relationships than studies which utilize survey methodology. He notes several problems
with experimental studies of self-interest. First, the population of experimental studies is
normally composed of undergraduate college students and the settings are artificial.
Secondly, these studies usually focus of common and well-understood aspects of the
students' daily life, which could be decided on a relatively simple cost-benefit
calculation. Finally, the subjective evaluation of self-interest may be nothing more than
an after-the-fact justification for an attitude. He contrasts these problems with survey
studies, which usually sample the general population by telephone in their homes.
Evaluations of self-interest are determined objectively. However, the subject of the
inquiry normally involves complex questions about which the respondent has less
knowledge and in which he has a smaller stake.
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Writing for rational choice advocates, Crano (1997) criticizes an earlier study by
Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) for insistence on attitudinal homogeneity among all
levels of vested interest. For example, a variable measuring opposition to bussing to
achieve racial balance in schools is used as the indicator of self-interest among Whites,
when only a very small percentage of survey respondents had children in schools affected
by a court order requiring bussing. Crano argues that a fair test of the effects of vested
interest in matters of public policy must include three elements. First, there must be a
measure of how the policy will impact the respondent’s life, preferably self-reported.
Second, there must be a reliable scale for measuring symbolic attitude. Finally, the study
must measure action on a policy-relevant issue, preferably using an index constructed
from a number of questions concerning aspects of that issue.
Leighley observes that the debate between proponents of rational choice
explanations of participation and those arguing for expressive incentives turns on
questions of operationalization of the variables and to the value accorded to post hoc
justifications provided by participants. He concludes that while the chance of affecting
public policy decisions is likely to be substantially higher for elites, collective political
action may not appear rational for ordinary citizens because of the limited chance of
success.
Contacting a government official, a political behavior similar but not identical to
making a comment on a proposed agency rule, is a political act that has been evaluated in
the context of material and symbolic interest. Although finding strong support for nonmaterial motivations in most types of political activities, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady
find that those subjects whose act of participation is contacting a government official
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identify material reasons as their chief motivation. Moon, Serra, and West (1993) find
that citizens most frequently contact their representatives to seek help with specific
problems. Likewise, in a study of more than two thousand citizen-initiated contacts with
municipal officials in Cincinnati, Ohio, Thomas (1982) finds that the ends of this type of
political participation tend to be instrumental and needs driven. Political efficacy acts as
a booster for the more advantaged and as a damper for the least advantaged. Thomas
contrasts two competing models of participation, finding each inadequate to explain
citizen-initiated contacts. First, the socioeconomic model predicts that contacts will
increase as socioeconomic status increases. A second model predicts that rates of
contacting will be distributed in a parabola between the vectors of high and low needs
and awareness. Study data fail to support either prediction. Thomas offers a clientele
model to explain the distribution of citizen-initiated contacts. According to this model,
the driving impetus for a citizen-initiated contact is the citizen's perceived need for
service from a particular agency. Secondarily, attitudes and information either stimulate
or impede that impetus. Thomas (1982) concludes:
A citizen who contacts a government agency usually seeks (1) a relatively
specific response (2) in the very immediate future ... By contrast, an
individual involved in some traditional form of political participation (e.g.,
voting, campaigning) usually has policy ends that are much less specific
with their achievement not expected so quickly (pp. 504-5).

This debate between proponents of material and symbolic motivations involves
more than mere methodological controversy. If political motivations stem from
individual-level calculations of material interests, government actions contrary to those
interests constitute an injury that may require compensation of some sort. If motivations
reflect only political symbolism, then the dominant political regime might educate
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disaffected individuals to the politically correct values (Sears, Hensler, and Speer). For
example, McAvoy finds that when citizen participants object to the siting of a hazardous
waste facility, those objections may be overcome through accommodations and
incentives. Had the objections been purely symbolic, there would be no reason to expect
that material incentives would provide appropriate compensation. Also, motivations may
be mixed. Oliver (1999) finds civic participation low in high-income homogeneous
urban communities. He attributes the low levels of civic activity to little need for
government services, a material motivation, and a general agreement on goals, indicating
a symbolic motivation.

Normative Theories of Citizen Participation

Not all contacts between citizens and government officials are without negative
intent or outcome. In a study of public opposition to radioactive waste sites, Kraft and
Clary (1991) observe that citizen participation in agency decision-making may lead to
community opposition and political stalemate. Among the reasons for increased
community resistance they identified: new environmental values; fear of technological
risks; a dramatic increase in the information available to the general public; less trust in
government and industry; and, statutory requirements for the inclusion of the public in
administrative processes. Likewise, Lovan, Murray, and Shaffer identify several
potential negative consequences of public participation including delays in reaching
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decisions, issue capture by unrepresentative interest groups, focusing on trivial issues,
and loss of confidence in decision-makers when efforts are not perceived as successful.
In another study of citizen participation in public budget making, Simonsen and
Robbins (2000) find that those who favor an expansive role for government would be
better served by limiting budget information and citizen participation in the budgeting
process. When citizens perceive themselves as customers of public goods rather than
participants in a cooperative effort, there is a decline in support for government services.
Simonsen and Robbins note that by engaging a discrete group of citizens in the budget
process and providing them with adequate financial information to make informed
decisions, those citizens are made less representative of the public they were selected to
represent.
A third study of public participation, Rohrbaugh and Wehr (1978) point out the
difficulty of determining citizen preferences, even in a small, relatively homogeneous
rural community. They conclude that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the
true preferences on complex public policy questions of even a single individual due to the
nature of the human cognitive process. Human judgment is complex, covert, and
inconsistent. Likewise, it can be reported only subjectively and introspectively, with
priorities and tradeoffs seldom accurately described by the decision-maker. This is
further complicated by the likelihood that citizens may over-dramatize their positions on
one or more single issues, thereby decreasing the possibility of compromise across even
relatively small polities.
Even more ominous is the potential for citizen participation causing harm to the
participants. Morrell (1999) finds that when citizen's views may be attributed to them,
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peer criticism may be directed at those opinions and at the individual responsible for
them. Identification with unpopular or politically incorrect ideas may lead to
chastisement or other negative incentives, reducing the likelihood of further participation
by the person receiving the chastisement or by others of like mind who observe her
treatment. Morrell recommends that discourse be structured to preserve the anonymity of
the participant. However, that would violate the democratic goal of transparency in the
public decision-making process.
But not all of the potential problems lie with the citizen participants. Public
officials are not above using public participation to accomplish agency ends. In
analyzing the impact of public hearings on General Revenue Sharing decisions and
behavior, Cole and Caputo (1984) conclude that while hearings had an immediate, shortterm impact on both behavior and public interest, the long-term effects were insignificant.
More ominously, they muse, “Unfortunately, rather than opening the process of
administration to public involvement, the public hearing may permit sanctioned isolation
of agencies and agency officials seeking as little program and policy change as possible”
(p. 415). More to the point, Thomas (1995) cautions public officials that when public
acceptance of a decision is most important, more public participation in decision-making
is appropriate. However, when the quality of the decision is most important, less public
participation is appropriate.
The foregoing sections have explored and elaborated theories of the drivers of
political participation, the nature of participation in the notice and comment process, the
role of interest groups in the pressure system, motivations for participation in pressure
politics, and normative theories of citizen participation. From these theoretical views,
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this study progresses to a discussion of the methodological concerns in the next chapter.
First, the selection of the sample of notice and comment participants is described. Then,
the hypotheses to be tested are articulated and the variables used to test these are
presented. Subsequent chapters cover testing hypotheses, presenting additional
descriptive data, and drawing conclusions.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

The previous chapter presents theories that are the product of prior research in the
area of citizen participation. In this section, those theories are applied to the hypotheses
that will be tested using Citizen Participation Study data. First, the data sources are
explained. Next, hypotheses are stated. Finally, technical aspects of testing procedures
and data presentation are elaborated.
Since this study proposes to evaluate the representativeness of notice and
comment participants, the characteristics of the general public must be determined. I use
the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES) for this purpose. This study is
selected because processing of the 2006 ANES survey had not been completed at the time
of polling for this study. The 2004 ANES uses face-to-face interviews with 1,212 preelection respondents and 1,066 post-election respondents (Center for Political Studies,
2004). Twenty-six specific questions contained in the ANES questionnaire are used to
identify characteristics of the survey respondents.
Given the importance of federal rulemaking to our complex regulatory state, there
has been relatively little research done on the participants in this essential process. For
many years, research into the notice and comment (N&C) process has been limited
because access to information concerning participants in this process was quite difficult.
Paper records were stored in agency offices, usually in Washington, D.C., but sometimes
in even less convenient locations. However, recent advances in electronic access to
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government agency databases open a vast and relatively unplowed field for academic
research (Coglianese, Shapiro, and Balla, 2005). Several agencies maintain fairly large
archives of comments on current and past proposals. Since the rule proposals are issued
by different agencies using somewhat different processes for securing participation,
receive different levels of media and interest group attention, concern different types of
issues, and receive comments from throughout the nation, a relatively large and diverse
pool of known political participants is available. From this pool, the sample used in this
study is drawn.

Sample Selection

Questions similar to those contained in the ANES survey were asked of 400 N&C
participants in a survey mailed on April 10, 2007. A copy of the survey instrument is
provided in Appendix A. Approximately 100 subjects were randomly selected from
those individuals offering comments to each of four particular notices of proposed
rulemaking. Random selection of rule proposals is inappropriate because most rule
proposals attract few, if any, comments by individuals acting as private citizens.
So, three factors influenced the selection of a particular notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) for this study. First, the number of comments made by private
citizens has to be sufficiently large to provide a reasonable pool of candidates for the
survey. A threshold level of 500 comments from individuals is established to meet this
criterion. Secondly, the comments must be made fairly recently. America has a mobile
population. Since the addresses of commenters are not updated after submission, the
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longer the interval between the comment and the survey, the lower the response rate.
Therefore, the pool of commenters is restricted to those between January 1, 2005 and
June 30, 2006. Finally, since an important aspect of this study is the impact of erulemaking on citizen participation, only those NPRMs accessible to e-comments are
considered. Data for these NPRMs are available through either the agency website or
regulations.gov. It should be noted that while the overwhelming majority of these
comments are made through e-comments or e-mail, not all comments to the NPRMs are
submitted electronically. Some comments are made through traditional means and are
subsequently scanned into the electronic database of comments. However, even if the
comment is not made via an electronic option, information about the NPRM and a wealth
of data relating to the proposed rule are available on-line. Since it would not be possible
to determine which particular commenters use on-line information, all individual
commenters are included in the pool. Seven NPRMs meet all of these criteria. However,
four of the seven are generated by a single entity, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Three of these environmental NPRMs have been eliminated. While this may
understate the magnitude of environmentalists in the mix of individual citizen
commenters, it allows a more balanced look at participants from a variety of issue areas.

Selection of Rule Proposals

The remaining NPRM promulgated by the EPA is EPA-HQ-TRI-2005-0071. It is
selected because it has more comments than other candidates from the EPA. Like most
proposed rules, this NPRM is the most recent step in a long and complex regulatory
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process. In the language of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know
Act (EPCRA), Congress granted to the EPA broad discretionary power to establish and
alter reporting requirements for certain toxic chemicals that are used, stored, or passed
through a facility. Currently, the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) tracks 30 chemical
categories and 531 specific chemicals. Depending on the type and quantity of toxic
chemicals involved, different methods of reporting are required. Based on the estimates
of an outside consulting firm, Form R which is required for larger quantities or more
toxic chemicals takes roughly one and one-half times as long to complete as Form A,
used for smaller quantities or less toxic chemicals (Environmental Protection Agency,
2005).
As part of its mandate from Congress, the EPA is required to periodically review
its regulations to determine if agency goals may be accomplished in a less burdensome
manner. This review began with a Stakeholder Dialogue sponsored by the EPA that
lasted from November, 2002, through February, 2004. Such a dialogue is actually a long
period of comment used during an early phase in the rulemaking process. Agency
records indicate that a total of 770 comments were received with sixty-three percent
coming from individuals, sixteen percent from environmental groups, fifteen percent
from industry, and six percent from government agencies (Environmental Protection
Agency).
Based on this feedback, the EPA determined to improve the process through three
initiatives. One involves eliminating some reporting items by utilizing information
already stored in agency data files. Another reduces the frequency of some TRI reports.
Most changes involve changing the requirement for annual reporting to biannual
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reporting. The change proposed on EPA-HQ-TRI-2005-0071 allows the use of a simpler
form of reporting for some less toxic chemicals that presently require more complex
reporting (Environmental Protection Agency).
Because three separate initiatives are being undertaken in roughly the same time
period, opponents to change, primarily environmental groups, link the three in their
comments. The relatively small change proposed on this NPRM is routinely described by
commenters as a means of reducing the information available to the public. However, the
language of the proposed rule indicates that it merely changes which form will be used
for the reporting. Likewise, it should be noted that the proposed changes do not
dramatically impact the bottom line of the firms seeking the changes. The EPA estimates
that in the worst case, reporting time will be reduced from 67 hours per report for the
more complex form to 45.6 hours for the less complex form. Even if the firm used a
fairly large number of TRI chemicals, it is doubtful that the savings would be critical to
the firm's survival (Environmental Protection Agency). The insistence of
environmentalists on no changes, even inconsequential changes, would seem to indicate
that participants are more influenced by symbolic than material motives.
The second NPRM selected for this study, APHIS-2005-0063, was initiated by a
petition from an affected interest group and proposes rules for the transportation and sale
of domestic ferrets. In March, 2004, the International Ferret Congress (IFC), in
conjunction with one veterinarian and six ferret shelter or support groups, petitioned the
Department of Agriculture to establish standards for the care and handling of domestic
ferrets under authority delegated to that agency under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA).
This law gives the Secretary of Agriculture the option of using a general standard or
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establishing a specific standard for any type of animal except birds, laboratory mice, and
domestic farm animals used for normal agricultural purposes. Currently, domestic ferrets
fall under the general standard. Petitioners claim that ferret kits (young) are taken from
their mothers too soon and improperly caged and fed. These deficiencies result in both
physical impairment of the young ferrets and a tendency to exhibit aggressive behavior.
Purchasers of the ferret kits are unable or unwilling to cope with these problems and a
disproportionate number of ferrets end up in shelters (Department of Agriculture, Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, 2005).
The web site of the IFC provides a link to a page containing information on the
proposed rule along with detailed instructions for making a comment either via the
Internet or conventional mail. Also, technical information and lists of key points are
provided along with several letters from sympathizers. For the less articulate supporters,
a letter authored by the American Ferret Association is provided. This requires the
concerned citizen to merely copy the letter, print her name and address, and sign the
letter. Of course, four copies are required by agency standards (International Ferret
Congress, 2006). It is anticipated that comments on this rule will be limited to a rather
insular community of persons and organizations that own, shelter, breed, service, or sell
ferrets. However, these material motivations may be mixed with symbolic attachments to
the concept of animal rights.
The third rule selected for this study is NPRM FAA-2004-17005, which proposes
rules to limit the ability of small aircraft to operate in specific airspaces around
Washington, D. C. Subsequent to the terrorist attacks in 2001, the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security designated certain parts of the airspace in and around the
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nation's capitol as no-fly zones. These restrictions were seen as necessary to protect vital
national assets in the area. Subsequently, service to the Reagan International Airport by
large commercial aircraft and certain corporate aircraft was allowed to resume but
restrictions on the smaller general aviation aircraft remained in effect. Use of three
proximate general aviation airports was restricted and owners and pilots must undergo
extensive vetting before receiving a personal identification number necessary for all
landings or take-offs. All aircraft operating in a wider designated area must use a coded
transponder for identification and maintain radio contact with designated control facilities
(Department of Transportation, 2007).
These restrictions are understandably unpopular with general aviation owners and
pilots in the region and their material motivations are clear. Even minor violations of
rules may result in severe fines and/or loss of licensing. More severe violations could
lead to the in-air destruction of the aircraft and occupants (Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, 2006). Agencies responsible for intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft
agree that the current airspace restrictions are the minimum required for national security
reasons. The proposed rule serves to codify these restrictions, effectively making them
permanent (Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration).
The final NPRM selected for this study addresses a different national security
issue. NPRM USCBP-2005-0005 seeks input on possible alternatives to requiring
American citizens who re-enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda to
present a passport as identification. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires
all United States citizens and nonimmigrant aliens to present passports as identification
when entering the United States. That law allows the Secretary of State and Secretary of
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Homeland Security to jointly waive the requirement for nonimmigrant aliens and the
Secretary of State to unilaterally waive it for U. S. citizens. Up until this point, U. S.
citizens and nonimmigrant citizens of Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda were allowed to use
driver's licenses, birth certificates, and other photographic identification cards issued for
that purpose when entering the United States from any point in the Western Hemisphere
other than Cuba (Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, 2005).
However, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Reduction Act of 2004
terminated the discretion of the Secretary of State in such matters and required all persons
entering the United States to provide a passport as identification. Some discretion
remained. The law required the Secretary of Homeland Security to specify what
documents may be used in lieu of a passport when entering the United States after
January 1, 2008 (Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection). Most Americans may never feel the impact of this rule. However, crossborder commuters, those who frequently travel on business to these countries, and those
with family or friends there are certain to feel the loss of what has been for many years a
special privilege. The material motivations of respondents are clear in their comments,
most of which express a desire to avoid paying for a passport.
In sum, the four NPRMs selected address issues that are important to their
communities of interest but none of these communities are likely to overlap excessively.
Likewise, there is a reasonable mix of those actuated by material concerns and those
expressing symbolic concerns. Geographically, persons concerned with the reporting of
toxic chemicals and protection of ferrets would not be expected to have any particular
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geographic concentration. Washington, D. C., and points of entry from Canada, Mexico,
and Bermuda are more discrete geographically, but they are widely dispersed from each
other. Also, individuals traveling to those destinations come from across the nation. So,
in aggregate, these NPRMs are expected to provide a diverse pool of N&C participants,
both in terms of issues and geography.
Each pool of NPRM respondents forms a cluster. For each cluster, random
numbers were generated encompassing the range of the docket numbers of comments
(Creswell, 1994). Documents matching each random number were examined to
determine that the comment is from an individual, that a complete mailing address in the
United States is provided, and that the individual has not been previously selected for
inclusion, since many participants make multiple comments. If all criteria are met, that
name and address is added to the pool of polling subjects. Approximately one hundred
subjects are selected from each NPRM in order to avoid excessive influence of any
particular cluster. The survey documents are similar but coded to indicate from which
NPRM the subject was selected. A total of one hundred forty one responses were
received by May 14, 2007, for a response rate of slightly more than thirty five percent.
This survey is referred to as the 2007 Citizen Participation Study (CPS). Throughout this
study, CPS respondents are used as a surrogate for all N&C participants.
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Hypotheses

Table 3.1
Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables
ANES Variable

V043249A
V043251
V043252
V043293X
V043299
V041109A

Description

Year of birth
Marital status
Highest grade of school or year of college completed
Household income
Race
Gender

A number of previous studies have described those who have the higher levels of
wealth, social status, and education as the more likely to participate in political activity
(Verba and Nie; Rosenstone and Hansen; Leighley; Lijphart; Putnam). The six variables
that deal with demographic and socioeconomic variables are displayed in Table 3.1
above. The data for these variables will be used to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1

The mean age of CPS respondents is higher than
that of the general public.

Hypothesis 2

CPS respondents are more likely to be married
than the general public.

Hypothesis 3

CPS respondents are better educated than the
general public.

Hypothesis 4

CPS respondents have higher household incomes
than the general public.
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Hypothesis 5

CPS respondents are more likely to be White
than the general public.

Hypothesis 6

CPS respondents are more likely to be male than
the general public.

Table 3.2
Organizational Membership
ANES Variable

V045170
V045170A

Description

Membership in a nonreligious organization
Number of nonreligious associations

Voluntary participationn in a variety of civic and social groups is associated with
political participation (Putnam; Ayala). Table 3.2 above displays the two variables gauge
relative levels of organizational membership. These variables will be used to test two
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7

CPS respondents are more likely to belong to
nonreligious associations than the general
public.

Hypothesis 8

CPS respondents who are members of
nonreligious organizations belong to more
associations than the members of the general
public who are association members.
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Table 3.3
Information Sources
ANES Variable
V043014
V043016*
V043017*
V043019
V045155

Description
Days during past week watched the national news on television
Days during past week watched the local news on television
Nights during past week watched the local news on television
Days during past week read local newspaper
Internet access

* Combined to reflect the total number of days watched local news
The media plays an important role in forming perceptions of one's political
environment (Ranney; Popkin; Putnam). Also, Internet use is associated with
participation in high-cost political behaviors (Bimber). Four study variables investigate
the respondent's access to and frequency of use of various media sources. These four
variables will be used to test the following hypotheses concerning information sources:

Hypothesis 9

CPS respondents watch national news on
television more frequently than the general
public.

Hypothesis 10

CPS respondents watch local news on
television more frequently than the general
public.

Hypothesis 11

CPS respondents read a daily newspaper more
frequently than the general public.

Hypothesis 12

CPS respondents are more likely to have
Internet access than the general public.
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Table 3.4
Measures of Political Participation
ANES Variable

Description

V045167

Contacting a government official

V045168

Attendance at a community meeting

V045153

Talking politics with family or friends

V045154

Listening to political talk radio

V045010

Talking with people to influence their voting decision

V045011

Attend political gatherings

V045012

Display campaign buttons, stickers, or signs

V045014

Make contributions to individual candidates

V045015

Make contributions to a political party

V045016

Make contributions to group that supports candidates

V045017A

Voting

Research indicates that social, civic and political participation predicts more
political participation (Dahl, 1989; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie; Putnam). The
next set of variables looks directly at various types of political participation behaviors.
The categories of response are yes or no and all questions are identical in both surveys.
The primary difference is that the ANES variables refer to the 2004 election cycle and the
CPS variables refer to the 2006 election cycle. The variables presented above in Table
3.4 are used to compare the CPS respondents to the general public in political activities
other than their particular comment to a proposed agency rule. This set of eleven
variables will be used to examine the level of political activity of CPS respondents other
than making comments to proposed rules by testing the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 13

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to call, write, or visit a
government official to express their views.
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Hypothesis 14

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to attend a community meeting
to discuss an issue.

Hypothesis 15

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to discuss politics with family or
friends.

Hypothesis 16

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to listen to political talk radio.

Hypothesis 17

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to try to influence the votes of
others.

Hypothesis 18

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to attend political meetings,
rallies, speeches, or similar events.

Hypothesis 19

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to use campaign buttons,
stickers, or signs.

Hypothesis 20

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to give money to political
candidates.

Hypothesis 21

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to make contributions to a
political party.
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Hypothesis 22

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to contribute to a group that
supports or opposes candidates.

Hypothesis 23

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to vote.

Table 3.5
Efficacy and Trust
ANES Variable

Description

V045202

People like me have little influence on government

V045204

Elections make government pay attention to the views of the people

V045198

Government is run by a few big interests

The final three variables address the issues of trust in government and political
efficacy. These particular questions are used because they relate most directly to
participation in the notice and comment process. The first relates to what Creig, Niemi,
and Silver would call external efficacy while the second and third address trust in
government institutions. If issue politics resemble ethnic politics, those with high
efficacy and low trust would be expected to be among the most active (Guterbock and
London). All CPS questions and answer categories are identical to those used for the
ANES variables. Respondents are asked if they agree or disagree with particular
statements. The following hypotheses are used to test relationship of trust and efficacy to
the N&C process:

Hypothesis 24

CPS respondents are less likely than the general
public to agree with the statement that people
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like themselves do not have any say in what
government does.

Hypothesis 25

CPS respondents are less likely than the general
public to agree with the statement that elections
make government pay attention to what the
people think.

Hypothesis 26

CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to view the government as being
controlled by special interests.

Data Presentation

In general, data for the hypotheses to be tested are either categorical or
continuous. All categorical data are analyzed using cross-tabulation and chi-square tests
for statistical significance. Only the Pearson chi-square is reported. Norusis (1997)
argues that this is sufficient in most cases and that the appropriateness of the Fisher's
Exact Test for two by two tables is an matter of "... controversy among statisticians..." (p.
305). In all cases involved in this study, the use of Pearson's chi-square does not change
the outcome from that calculated using more restrictive assumptions. Combined sample
and subgroup cross-tabulation tables are presented in the text of Chapter 4 and chi-square
tables are presented in Appendix B.
Continuous data are analyzed using independent samples t-tests when comparing
the means of the ANES and CPS samples. When CPS data are divided into subgroups,
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used and, if differences in means are found to
be statistically significant, a Dunnett's C multiple comparison is calculated to determine
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which issue groups are significant contributors. The calculation of homogeneity of
variance for subgroups is not reported due to the similarity of issue group sizes. Norusis
states, "In practice, if the number of cases in each of the groups is similar, the equality of
variance assumption is not too important" (p. 261). Combined sample and subgroup
tables of group statistics are presented in the text of Chapter 4 and all other tables are
contained in Appendix B.
In addition to the variables necessary to test these hypotheses, the CPS survey
document includes a series of questions concerning technical aspects of the process of
making comments and participant behaviors. No hypotheses are tested for these
variables due to a deficiency of theory in the areas addressed. These variables address
information adequacy, interest group involvement, other political efforts, prior comments
on proposed rules, the method of making the comment, and the relative difficulty of the
comment process. In addition to providing valuable information for agencies engaged in
the N&C process, this data provides additional insights into some of the results of
hypothesis testing. This data is presented in Chapter 5.

56

Chapter 4
Data and Analysis

In this chapter, the hypotheses stated in the previous chapter are tested. Based on
previous research presented in the literature review, it is anticipated that CPS respondents
will score higher in socioeconomic indicators, have greater associational linkage, utilize
more information sources, and participate in more political activities, both high and low
cost. This investigation begins with an examination demographic and socioeconomic
indicators of citizen participation.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Indicators

Table 4.1
Group Statistics for Age
Sample/Subgroup
ANES
CPS
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals

Number
1200
139
25
36
38
40

Standard. Standard.
Mean
Deviation Error Mean
47.21
17.18
.50
53.36
13.29
1.13
45.52
12.45
2.49
50.86
12.24
2.04
57.79
12.79
2.08
56.30
12.90
2.04

Hypothesis 1 states that CPS respondents are older than the general public. Age
data are continuous. A summary of group statistics presented in Table 4.1 above indicate
that the mean age for CPS respondents is more than six years older than the mean age for
ANES respondents. A t-test presented in Table B.1a in Appendix B indicates that the
equality of variance assumption has been violated. The t-statistic for equal variances not
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assumed is significant, indicating that there is less than one chance in one thousand that
the difference in the means of the ANES and CPS samples occurred by chance. This
evidence supports the hypothesis that the mean for people who participate in the notice
and comment process is higher than the mean of the general public.
Because the CPS data indicate to which rule the respondent made a comment, the
data are divided into subgroups in order to test the robustness of the findings for the
entire sample. The Animal Rights subgroup actually has a lower age mean than the
ANES sample. However, all other CPS subgroups exceed the age mean for the ANES
sample. The data reveal what appears to be a substantial difference in means between the
subgroups. The difference between the highest and lowest subgroup age means is twice
the difference in the ANES and CPS samples. A one-way analysis of variance test is
utilized to determine the impact of differences in issue group means. Results of this
analysis, presented below in Table B.1b in Appendix B indicate that differences in
subgroup means are statistically significant at the .001 level. There is only one
possibility in one thousand that the differences occurred by chance. A multiple
comparison of subgroup means displayed in Table B.1c.in Appendix B shows that three
of the means of the issue groups differ significantly. Only the Aircraft Over DC
subgroup is close enough to the other subgroup means to avoid a significant difference.
So, while age is generally related positively to participation in the N&C process, the
subject matter of the proposed rule change affects the mean age for particular sets of
commenters. This number and level of differences undermines support for the hypothesis
on age.
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The next demographic variable to be considered is marital status. Hypothesis 2
states that commenters on proposed federal rules are more likely to be married than the
general public. The ANES uses several different categories of marital status. For the
purpose of testing this hypothesis, all categories other than married have been lumped
together into an unmarried category. The results are provided in Table 4.2 below. More
than two-thirds of CPS respondents are married, compared to only slightly more than half
of ANES respondents.

Table 4.2
Cross-Tabulation for Marital Status

Sample/Subgroup
Count
ANES
Percent
Count
CPS
Percent
Count
Animal Rights
Percent
Count
Aircraft Over DC
Percent
Re-entry Documents Count
Percent
Count
Toxic Chemicals
Percent

Not
Married Married
625
586
51.60%
48.40%
97
42
69.80%
30.20%
14
11
56.00%
44.00%
26
10
72.20%
27.80%
28
10
73.70%
26.30%
29
11
72.50%
27.50%

Total
1211
100.00%
139
100.00%
25
100.00%
36
100.00%
38
100.00%
40
100.00%

A chi-square test presented in Table B.2a in Appendix B indicates the differences
between observed and expected frequencies for the ANES and CPS samples are
statistically significant. There is less than one chance in one thousand that these
differences are the result of chance. These results provide strong support for the
hypothesis that commenters on proposed federal rule changes are more likely to be
married than the general public. But, as demonstrated above, it is possible that there are
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differences among CPS subgroups that might undermine support for the hypothesis on
marital status. There appears to be a fairly substantial difference in the marital status of
the Animal Rights subgroup compared to other CPS subgroups. The differences in
subgroups are almost as large as the difference in samples. However, a chi square test
shown below in Table B.2b indicates that the differences fail to achieve statistical
significance. The reason for the difference in findings is that large samples tend to
approximate a standard distribution. Smaller sample sizes are less likely to do so and the
certainty of the true shape of the distribution is less. The t-distribution used for smaller
samples assumes a fatter tail than would be the case in larger samples, meaning that there
would be fewer cases around a central value and more cases at the extremes of the
distribution curve. So, the amount of difference in means required for a finding of
statistical significance is larger (Babbie, 2004). So, the consistency of these results
provides unqualified support for the hypothesis. Those individuals who make comments
on proposed federal rules are more likely to be married than the general public.
The third hypothesis states that commenters on proposed federal rules are better
educated than the general public. The ANES collects interval data from zero through
sixteen years of formal education. However, all years of education above this are
grouped into one category. Therefore, education data is divided into four categories for
analysis. Table 4.3 on the following page describes the educational achievements of the
ANES and CPS subjects in four categories. The differences in the samples are most
apparent at the extremes. ANES respondents are more than three times as likely as CPS
respondents to have high school education or less. On the opposite pole, CPS
respondents are nearly twice as likely as ANES respondents to hold college or advanced
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degrees. A chi-square test of statistical significance provided in Table B.3a in Appendix
B indicates that differences in observed and expected values for the ANES and CPS
samples are statistically significant. There is less than one chance in one thousand that
the differences happened by chance. These results indicate support for the hypothesis
that commenters on proposed federal rules have more education than the general public.

Table 4.3
Cross-tabulation of Education Category

Sample/Subgroup
ANES
Count
Percent
CPS
Count
Percent
Animal Rights
Count
Percent
Aircraft Over DC
Count
Percent
Re-entry Documents Count
Percent
Toxic Chemicals
Count
Percent

High
School or
Some
Less
College
464
352
38.30%
29.10%
18
31
12.90%
22.30%
4
10
16.00%
40.00%
3
6
8.30%
16.70%
8
6
21.10%
15.80%
3
9
7.50%
22.50%

College
Graduate
or
Advanced
Degree
394
32.60%
90
64.70%
11
44.00%
27
75.00%
24
63.20%
28
70.00%

Total
1210
100.00%
139
100.00%
25
100.00%
36
100.00%
38
100.00%
40
100.00%

Results of cross-tabulation for education categories by CPS subgroup again
demonstrated relatively high variation. The Animal Rights subgroup has a substantially
lower percentage of college graduates and holders of advanced degrees than other
subgroups. However, a chi-square test presented in Table B.3d in Appendix B indicates
that differences in observed and expected frequencies are not statistically significant.
This finding reinforces support for the hypothesis that participants in the N&C process
have more years of formal education than the general public.
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The next hypothesis looks at family income. It states that CPS respondents have
higher family incomes than the general public. Table 4.4 on the following page presents
a cross-tabulation for family income. Comparing the two samples, ANES respondents
are about twice as likely as CPS respondents to occupy the lowest income category. At
the opposite pole, CPS respondents are nearly twice as likely as ANES respondents to be
in the top two income categories. As indicated in Table B.4a in Appendix B, the
differences between observed and expected frequencies are statistically significant.
There is less than one possibility in one thousand that these results are merely a product
of chance. The data provide strong support for the hypothesis that participants in the
N&C process have higher family incomes than the general public.

Table 4.4
Cross-tabulation of Family Income
Sample
Family Income
0 - $49,999

ANES
Count
Percent

Count
Percent
$105,000 and greater Count
$50,000 - $104,999

Total

Percent
Count
Percent

CPS Subgroup

CPS

Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
556
42
598
10
9
11
12
51.9% 31.8% 49.7% 43.5%
25.7%
31.4%
30.8%
359
54
413
33.6% 40.9% 34.4%
155
36
191

9
39.1%
4

11
31.4%
15

16
45.7%
8

18
46.2%
9

14.5% 27.3% 15.9% 17.4%
1070
132 1202
23
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

42.9%
35
100.0%

22.9%
35
100.0%

23.1%
39
100.0%

The Animal Rights subgroup is about half again as likely as other subgroups to
fall into the lowest income category. However, it is comparable in the middle category
where the bulk of CPS respondents tended to congregate. The results of chi-square tests
displayed above in Table B.4d in Appendix B indicate that the differences between
observed and expected counts in the cross-tabulation by CPS subgroup fail to achieve
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statistical significance. So, apparent differences between the CPS subgroups are not
meaningful. This provides unqualified support for the hypothesis that CPS respondents
have higher family incomes than the general public.

Table 4.5a
Cross-tabulation for Six Categories of Race

Race
Black
Asian
Native
American

Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count

Percent
Hispanic Count
Percent
Count
White
Percent
Count
Other
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

CPS Subgroup
ANES
Animal
Aircraft
Re-entry
Toxic
Sample
Rights
Over DC Documents Chemicals Total
184
0
0
0
0
184
15.3%
13.7%
33
0
0
0
0
33
2.7%
2.5%
19
1
1
1
0
22
1.6%
85
7.1%
876
72.8%
7
.6%
1204
100.0%

4.0%

2.9%

24
96.0%

34
97.1%

2.7%
1
2.7%
35
94.6%

25
100.0%

35
100.0%

37
100.0%

1.6%
4
90
10.3%
6.7%
34
1003
87.2% 74.9%
1
8
2.6%
.6%
39
1340
100.0% 100.0%

The next hypothesis deals with the subject of race and ethnicity. Several CPS
respondents refused to identify their race. Others identified themselves as "Native
American" but provided unsolicited comments indicating that they were born in the
United States and/or the question seemed objectionable. Even the ANES sample includes
thirteen subjects with no racial identification and that survey was done face-to-face.
While the reasons for individuals refusing to provide or providing questionable data on
race is beyond the scope of this study, the observation of this disinclination among
participants suggests that the participation of Whites in the N&C process is understated.
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The sixteen categories of race in the ANES data have been reduced to six
categories in Table 4.5a above. The ANES over-sampled Blacks and under-sampled
Hispanics, based on Census estimates for that period (Bureau of the Census, 2004). Still,
it reflects a reasonable level of racial diversity similar to that found in the general public.
On the other hand, cross-tabulation results for the subcategories of the CPS sample reveal
a dearth of diversity. Perhaps the most striking feature of the CPS mix is the total
absence of Black respondents.
While this data provide a more complete look at the race of CPS participants, the
hypothesis to be tested states simply that participants in the N&C process are more likely
to be White than the general public. To test this hypothesis, race data is consolidated into
two categories, White and Non-White. Results of cross-tabulation are presented below in
Table 4.5b. Whites are the majority race in the nation by a substantial, if declining,
margin. Likewise, they constitute a substantial majority in both samples. On the other
hand, Non-Whites are four times as likely to be included in the ANES sample as in the
CPS sample.

Table 4.5b
Cross-tabulation for White and Non-White by Sample
Race
ANES
Non-White Count
Percent
Count
White
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

CPS Subgroups

Sample
CPS

Sample
Total

328
9
337
27.20%
6.60% 25.10%
876
127
1003
72.80% 93.40% 74.90%
1204
136
1340
100.00% 100.00% 100.00%

Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
1
1
4.00%
2.90%
24
34
96.00% 97.10%
25
35
100.00% 100.00%

2
5
5.40% 12.80%
35
34
94.60% 87.20%
37
39
100.00% 100.00%
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A chi-square test presented in Table B.5a indicates that the differences between
observed and expected frequencies for the ANES and CPS samples are statistically
significant. There is less than one prospect in one thousand that this distribution occurred
purely by chance. This supports Hypothesis 5. At the sample level, the percentage of
Whites participating in the notice and comment process is both substantially and
significantly higher that that in the general public.
Among the CPS subgroups, although most of the Non-White respondents
participated in the Toxic Chemical subgroup, the White majority in all issue groups is
overwhelming. Chi-square testing presented in Table B.5b in Appendix B indicates that
the differences in observed and expected counts for the CPS subgroups fail to achieve
statistical significance, although with the caution that some cells have expected counts of
less than five. This evidence serves to buttress the overall finding. The population of
notice and comment participants has very little diversity. But, perhaps, this does not rule
out the possibility that an agency rule proposal dealing specifically with minority issues
might attract greater minority participation.

Table 4.6
Cross-tabulation for Gender
Sample
ANES
CPS

Gender

Male
Female
Total

Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent

Total

CPS Subgroup
Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
CPS
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals Subgroup
Total

566
75
641
1
33
46.70% 54.30% 47.50%
4.00% 94.30%
646
63
709
24
2
53.30% 45.70% 52.50% 96.00%
5.70%
1212
138
1350
25
35
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%

22
57.90%
16
42.10%
38
100.00%

19
75
47.50% 54.30%
21
63
52.50% 45.70%
40
138
100.00% 100.00%
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The next hypothesis deals with the gender. Hypothesis 6 states that N&C
participants are more likely to be male than the ANES sample. A cross-tabulation of the
two samples is provided in Table 4.6 on the previous page. The percentages are a reverse
image of each other, with the ANES sample including more women than men and the
CPS sample including more men than women. However, the differences are relatively
small. A chi-square test of statistical significance presented in Table B.6a in Appendix B
shows that the differences in observed and expected frequencies for the samples
approach, but do not achieve, statistical significance. Therefore, the hypothesis on
gender is not supported.
A look at the constituencies of the individual subgroups of the CPS sample
provides a clue this failure. Animal rights are almost exclusively a female issue and
restrictions of private aircraft over Washington, D. C. is almost exclusively a male issue.
The data strongly suggest that the issue content of the proposed rule change drives gender
differences in rates of participation for these two issue interests. The other issues exhibit
more balanced gender participation. A chi-square test presented in Table 4.6d below
indicates that the differences between observed and expected frequencies for CPS
subgroups are statistically significant. This supports a modified gender hypothesis.
Gender may not be the driver of participation, but it strongly influences who is more
likely to participate in particular kinds of rule proposals.
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Association Membership

Moving away from demographic and socioeconomic determinants, the next two
hypotheses investigate the power of associations in driving N&C participation.
Hypothesis 7 states that CPS respondents are more likely to belong to non-religious
associations than the general public. A cross-tabulation of organization membership is
provided in Table 4.7 on the next page. The differences in rates of civic association
membership are substantial. While considerably fewer than half of ANES respondents
indicated membership in a non-religious organization, more than two-thirds of CPS
respondents do so. A chi-square test of statistical significance presented in Table B.7a in
Appendix B indicates that the difference in observed and expected frequencies for the
two samples is statistically significant. The data strongly support the hypothesis that
N&C participants are more likely than the general public to participate in non-religious
associations.

Table 4.7
Cross-tabulation for Organizational Membership
CPS Subgroup

Sample
Organization
Member
Yes
No
Total

ANES
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent

CPS

Total

Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Subgroup
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
Total

445
95
540
13
33
41.80% 67.40% 44.80% 50.00% 91.70%
620
46
666
13
3
58.20% 32.60% 55.20% 50.00%
8.30%
1065
141
1206
26
36
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%

19
48.70%
20
51.30%
39
100.00%

30
75.00%
10
25.00%
40
100.00%

95
67.40%
46
32.60%
141
100.00%
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However, a look at the CPS issue groups reveals a more complex relationship
between organization membership and N&C participation. The results of crosstabulation of organization membership by CPS subgroup demonstrates higher levels of
association membership for all CPS subgroups than for the ANES sample. However,
there is substantial variation among the CPS subgroups. The Aircraft Over DC subgroup
is almost twice as likely as the Re-entry Documents subgroup to belong to non-religious
associations. The results of chi-square testing presented in Table B.7b in Appendix B
indicates that the differences between observed and expected counts for the CPS
subgroups are statistically significant. This indicates that the role of associations in
driving N&C participation, while an important factor in all types of proposed rules, is
more important in some areas than others. But, since the CPS rates are consistently
above the ANES rate of membership, these significant differences do not challenge
support for Hypothesis 7.
The next hypothesis expands the investigation of the role of associations in the
N&C comment process. Hypothesis 8 states that CPS respondents who belong to nonreligious associations belong to more such organizations than do members of the general
public. Table 4.8 below presents group statistics for number of organizations. As
hypothesized, the mean for number of organizations is higher for the CPS sample than for
the ANES sample. N&C participants who belong to non-religious organizations belong
to half again as many such organizations as the general public.
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Table 4.8
Means for Number of Organizations

Group/Subgroup Number
445
ANES
95
CPS
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Total

13
33
19
30
95

Standard Standard
Mean
Deviation
Error
2.13
1.55
0.007
3.46
3.89
0.4
2.54
2.82
2.68
5.07
3.46

1.15
1.42
1.38
6.39
3.89

0.42
0.25
0.32
1.17
0.4

An independent samples t-test for the number of organizations, displayed in Table
B.8a in Appendix B, reveals a violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption. The
t-statistic when equal variances are not assumed is significant at the .001 level. These
test results support the hypothesis that CPS respondents who belong to non-religious
organizations belong to more of such organizations than ANES respondents.
Looking next to the CPS subgroups, the mean for the Toxic Chemical subgroup
appears to be out of line with the others and is nearly twice the mean of the less active
Animal Rights issue group. However, an analysis of variance presented in Table B.8b
indicates that the differences in subgroup means narrowly fail to achieve statistical
significance. The relative homogeneity of CPS subgroups reinforces support for
Hypothesis 8. Across a range of issue groups, participants in the notice and comment
process who belong to non-religious organization belong to more of those associations
than does the general public.
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Sources of Information

Table 4.9
Means for Number of Days Watched National News

Group/Subgroup
ANES
CPS
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC

Number
1210
140
26
36

Mean
3.58
4.12
4.19
4.00

Re-entry
Documents

39

Toxic Chemicals

39

Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error

2.76
2.71
2.74
2.67

0.008
0.23
0.54
0.45

4.95

2.42

0.39

3.36

2.87

0.46

The next set of hypotheses examines the relationship between participation in the
N&C process and use of various information sources. It is generally anticipated that
political participants are better informed than non-participants. Hypothesis 9 states that
CPS respondents watch national news on television more frequently than the general
public. Respondents to both surveys were asked the number of days in the week that they
watched national news programs. Since the data are continuous, group statistics for the
means are presented in Table 4.9 above. The mean for the CPS sample is about thirteen
percent higher than that for the ANES sample. The results of an independent samples ttest are presented in Table B.9a in Appendix B reveals that the assumption of equal
variances is not supported. However, the t-statistic for equal variances not assumed is
significant at the .05 level. This supports Hypothesis 9.
CPS subgroup means reveal that the Re-entry Documents subgroup watches
televised national news considerably more frequently than the Toxic Chemical subgroup.
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However, an analysis of variance presented in Table B.9b indicates that the differences in
means fail to achieve statistical significance. The consistency of findings across a range
of subgroups supports the hypothesis that N&C participants watch national news on
television more than does the general public.
Along the same lines, the next hypothesis states that CPS respondents watch local
news on television more frequently than the general public. Group statistics displayed on
the following page in Table 4.10 indicate that there is a difference in means, but the
direction of difference is exactly the opposite of that hypothesized. An independent
samples t-test presented in Table B.10a in Appendix B reveals that the t-statistic for equal
variances not assumed achieves statistical significance at the .05 level. Because of the
direction of the difference, Hypothesis 10 is not supported. The general public watches
local news on television more frequently than N&C participants.

Table 4.10
Group Statistics for Number of Days Watched Local News
Sample/Subgroup Number
ANES
CPS
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry
Documents
Toxic Chemicals

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error
Mean

1210
139
26
36
39

4.47
3.98
4.23
3.56
5.03

2.78
2.65
2.45
2.52
2.29

0.008
0.22
0.48
0.42
0.37

38

3.13

2.92

0.47

As is the case with means for watching national news, there is considerably more
variation in means among CPS subgroups than between ANES and CPS samples. A oneway analysis of variance presented in Table B.10b in Appendix B indicates that the
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differences in issue group means achieves statistical significance. A multiple comparison
of means presented in Table B.10c in Appendix B indicates that the difference between
the Re-entry Subgroup and the Toxic Chemical Subgroup means for watching local news
on television is significant. However, neither differs significantly from other CPS
subgroups. This indicates that the viewing of local news among N&C participants may
vary with the issue groups considered. Since three subgroup means are below the ANES
mean and one is above, any conclusion about the relationship between viewing televised
local news and participation in the notice and comment process may be problematic.
The next hypothesis changes the focus from television to the print media. In each
survey, subjects were asked how many days in the past week they read a daily
newspaper. Group statistics for this continuous data are summarized in Table 4.11 on the
following page. For this variable, the difference in means is substantial and in the
direction hypothesized. CPS respondents read daily newspapers twenty-seven percent
more often than the general public. Results of significance testing are presented in Table
B.11a in Appendix B. The equality of variance assumption is violated, and the t-statistic
for equal variances not assumed is significant, meaning that the difference in means
between the samples did not occur by chance. Along with the magnitude of the
difference in means, this strongly supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are more
likely to read a daily newspaper than the general public.
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Table 4.11
Group Statistics for Days Read Daily Newspaper
Sample/Subgroup Number
1212
ANES
140
CPS
26
Animal Rights
36
Aircraft Over DC
39
Re-entry Documents
39
Toxic Chemicals

Standard Std. Error
Mean
Deviation
Mean
3.08
2.88
.008
4.23
2.73
.23
2.54
2.50
.49
4.19
2.67
.45
4.85
2.67
.43
4.77
2.62
.42

An examination of subgroup means reveals that the mean for the Animal Rights
subgroup trails the means of other subgroups by a substantial margin and is lower than
the ANES mean. Members of this subgroup are much less likely to read a daily
newspaper than their peers. A one-way analysis of variance presented in Table B.11b in
Appendix B shows that differences in means is statistical significant at the .01 level. A
multiple comparison of means presented Table B.11c in Appendix B reveals that, as is
the case with the age variable, the mean for the Animal Rights subgroup differs
significantly from the Re-entry Documents and Toxic Chemicals subgroups, while the
Aircraft Over DC subgroup has no significant difference in means with any subgroup.
This means that although there is a substantial and significant difference in the number of
days that N&C participants read daily newspapers as compared to the general public,
particular issues might attract the participation of interested parties who are less inclined
to read the newspaper. The significant differences among the subgroups undermine
support for Hypothesis 11. While most of the CPS issue groups are more likely to read
daily newspapers than the general public, the type of issue for which comment is solicited
impacts the outcome for this hypothesis.
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Table 4.12
Cross-tabulation for Internet Access
Internet
Access
Yes
No
Total

ANES
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent

Sample
CPS
Total

764
136
71.7% 96.5%
302
5
28.3%
3.5%
1066
141
100.0% 100.0%

Animal
Rights

26
100.0%
0

36
100.0%
0

26
100.0%

36
100.0%

CPS Subgroup
Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Over DC Documents Chemicals
35
39
900
89.7%
97.5%
74.6%
4
1
307
10.3%
2.5%
25.4%
39
40
1207
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

The final hypothesis to be tested in this section concerning sources of information
deals with Internet access. Given the availability of free Internet access at a variety of
public institutions such as schools, colleges, libraries, service organizations, and various
government offices, this hypothesis might seem pointless. However, there is a difference
between having a facility available at no cost and taking the necessary steps to achieve
access. The results of cross-tabulation for Internet access presented above in Table 4.12
demonstrate that more than a quarter of the general public claims to have no Internet
access. This stands in stark contrast to the ninety six percent of CPS respondents who
report having access. A chi-square test displayed in Table B.12a in Appendix B indicates
that differences in expected and observed counts are statistically significant. There is less
than one possibility in one thousand that this relationship is the product of chance. These
results strongly support the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely than the
general public to have access to the Internet.
Only about four percent of CPS respondents indicate that they do not have
Internet access. Even though four out of five of those lacking access are in a single
subgroup, a chi-square test presented in Table B.12b in Appendix B indicates that the
difference in observed and expected counts fails to achieve statistical significance,
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although half of the cells have expected counts of less than five due to the high rates of
Internet access. This means that there is consistency across CPS subgroups and
buttresses the finding that N&C participants are more likely than the general public to
have Internet access.

Political Activity

Table 4.13
Cross-tabulation for Contact Government Official
Contact
Government
Official
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

Sample
CPS Subgroup
CPS
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
222
101
323
12
25
30
34
20.8% 72.7% 26.8% 50.0%
69.4%
76.9%
85.0%
844
38
882
12
11
9
6
79.2% 27.3% 73.2% 50.0%
30.6%
23.1%
15.0%
1066
139
1205
24
36
39
40
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%

ANES

Since making a comment on a proposed federal agency rule is a political activity,
it is anticipated that CPS respondents have higher levels of other political activities than
the general public. Eleven hypotheses are tested in this section. The first states that CPS
respondents are more likely than the general public to contact a government official.
Cross-tabulation results are displayed on the previous page in Table 4.13 and the
differences are striking. CPS respondents are about three and a half times as likely to
contact a government official as ANES respondents. Given the magnitude of this
difference, it is unsurprising that a chi-square test displayed in Table B.13A in Appendix
B indicates that the difference in expected and observed counts is statistically significant.
These results provide strong support for this hypothesis that participants in the N&C
process are more likely than the general public to contact a government official.
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Results for CPS subgroups demonstrate some differences, with the Animal Rights
subgroup standing at some distance from the other subgroups. However, even this set of
respondents contact government officials at more than twice the rate of the general
public. A chi-square test presented below in Table B.13b in Appendix B indicates that
the differences in observed and expected counts between the various subgroups achieve
statistical significance. However, since all categories of CPS respondents exhibit higher
rates of contacting government officials than ANES respondents, differences between
subgroups should not be interpreted as detracting from the strength of support for
Hypothesis 13.

Table 4.14
Cross-tabulation for Attend Public Meeting
Attend
Public
Meeting
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Total Count
Percent

Sample
ANES
CPS

292
27.4%
773
72.6%
1065
100.0%

CPS Subgroup
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals

59
351
7
42.8% 29.2% 29.2%
79
852
17
57.2% 70.8% 70.8%
138
1203
24
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

13
36.1%
23
63.9%
36
100.0%

15
39.5%
23
60.5%
38
100.0%

24
60.0%
16
40.0%
40
100.0%

The next hypothesis extends this comparison of political participation to attending
public meetings. Hypothesis 14 states that CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to attend public meetings. Cross-tabulation results are presented in Table
4.14 above. Although CPS respondents are substantially more likely than ANES
respondents to attend public meetings, the dramatic difference exhibited in contacting
government officials is diminished. Still, chi-square testing displayed in Table B.14a in
Appendix B indicates that the differences between observed and expected frequencies are
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statistically significant. This supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are more
likely than the general public to attend public meetings.
Cross-tabulation results by CPS subgroup reveal that the rate of attending public
meetings is more than twice as high for the Toxic Chemical as for the Animal Rights
subgroup. However, in this case, the Animal Rights subset is closer to the remainder of
the sample than the environmentalists. In spite of this seemingly large difference in rates,
a chi square test presented in Table B.14b in Appendix B indicates that the differences
narrowly fail to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level. The null hypothesis that
the differences happened by chance cannot be rejected. This fortifies support for
Hypothesis 14. N&C participants are more likely than the general public to attend public
meetings.

Table 4.15
Cross-tabulation for Discuss Politics
Discuss
Politics
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Total Count
Percent

Sample
CPS Subgroup
CPS
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
292
131
423
20
35
37
39
27.4% 94.2% 35.1% 83.3%
97.2%
94.9%
97.5%
773
8
781
4
1
2
1
72.6%
5.8% 64.9% 16.7%
2.8%
5.1%
2.5%
1065
139
1204
24
36
39
40
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%

ANES

Hypothesis 15 states that CPS respondents are more likely than the general public
to discuss politics with family and friends. Cross-tabulation data presented in Table 4.15
above indicates that CPS respondents are much more likely than ANES respondents to
engage in this relatively low-cost political activity. Only slightly more than a quarter of
ANES respondents claim to discuss politics. This plainly contrasts with the nine out of
ten CPS respondents who say they discuss politics with family or friends. Chi-square
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testing displayed in Table B.15a indicates that the differences in observed and expected
values are statistically significant. This strongly supports the hypothesis. N&C
respondents are much more likely than the general public to discuss politics with family
and friends.
Cross-tabulation results for this variable by CPS subgroup clearly demonstrate
that this tendency to discuss politics remains strong throughout all categories of N&C
participants tested. Even among Animal Rights respondents, who seem to trail the pack
in many regards, political conversation is reported by more than eight out of ten. Chisquare testing exhibited in Table B.15b on the previous page confirms that the relatively
small differences in the observed and expected counts among the different issue groups
fail to achieve statistical significance. This consistency among subgroups serves to
reinforce support for the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely than the
general public to discuss politics with family and friends.

Table 4.16
Cross-tabulation for Listen to Talk Radio
Listen to
Talk Radio
Yes
No
Total

Sample
CPS Subgroup
CPS
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
Count
471
100
571
16
29
26
29
Percent 44.2% 73.0% 47.5% 66.7%
80.6%
70.3%
72.5%
Count
595
37
632
8
7
11
11
Percent 55.8% 27.0% 52.5% 33.3%
19.4%
29.7%
27.5%
Count
1066
137
1203
24
36
37
40
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%
ANES

The next hypothesis probes the juncture of politics and entertainment. Hypothesis
16 states that CPS respondents are more likely to listen to political talk radio than the
general public. Table 4.16 above displays the results of cross-tabulation. The difference
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between the ANES and CPS samples is not as pronounced as it is with the previous
participation indicator, perhaps because of the respondents' taste in entertainment or lack
thereof. Still, a substantially larger percentage of CPS respondents say they listen to
political talk radio than do ANES respondents. Results of chi-square testing presented on
in Table B.16a in Appendix B show that differences in observed and expected counts
achieve statistical significance. There is less than one possibility in one thousand that the
differences happened by chance. This supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are
more likely than the general public to listen to talk radio.
Cross-tabulation results by CPS subgroup indicate that the rate of listening to
political talk radio is relatively consistent across N&C participants. As might be
expected, the less politically active Animal Rights issue group is the least likely to listen
to political talk radio. The Aircraft Over DC subgroup is the most likely. However,
these differences in observed and expected counts fail to achieve statistical significance.
So, it may be concluded that there is neither a substantial nor significant difference in the
rates of listening between the issue groups. This underpins the finding that N&C
participants are more likely than the general public to listen to political talk radio.
So far, the hypotheses have dealt with fairly passive activities. Even discussing
politics with family and friends requires no more than an exchange of comments in a
supportive setting. The next hypothesis ventures into a more active role in the political
life of one's community. No matter how homogeneous our political community might be,
there are going to be differences in issue positions or personal attributes among the
candidates for public office. Hypothesis 17 states that CPS respondents are more likely
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than the general public to try to influence other voters to vote for a particular candidate
for public office.

Table 4.17
Cross-tabulation for Try to Influence Voters
Try to
Influence
Voters
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

Sample
CPS Subgroup
CPS
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
517
89
606
13
23
22
31
48.5% 64.0% 50.3% 54.2%
63.9%
56.4%
77.5%
549
50
599
11
13
17
9
51.5% 36.0% 49.7% 45.8%
36.1%
43.6%
22.5%
1066
139
1205
24
36
39
40
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

ANES

The results for cross-tabulation by sample are presented in Table 4.17 on the
previous page. While the differences in rates for trying to influence other voters are not
as great as for some participation variables presented earlier, there is still a fifteen-point
spread between the CPS and ANES samples. Chi-square results displayed in Table B.17a
in Appendix B, the differences in observed and expected counts are statistically
significant at the .001 level. So, the differential in rates of this behavior is both
substantial and significant. Results support Hypothesis 17. N&C participants are more
likely to try to influence other voters than are members of the general public.
Cross-tabulation analysis of data by CPS subgroup indicates a twenty three-point
spread between the issue groups with Animal Rights at the bottom and Toxic Chemicals
at the top. This relationship is similar to that witnessed in Hypothesis 15. Similarly, chisquare testing presented in Table B.17b in Appendix B indicates that the differences in
observed and expected values are not statistically significant. The differences could have
happened by chance. This demonstrates consistency of support for Hypothesis 17.
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Notice and comment participants are more likely than the general public to try to
influence the votes of others.

Table 4.18
Cross-tabulation for Attend Campaign Meeting
Attend
Campaign
Meeting
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

ANES

Sample
CPS
Total

81
28
109
7.6% 20.1%
9.0%
985
111
1096
92.4% 79.9% 91.0%
1066
139
1205
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Animal
Rights
2
8.3%
22
91.7%
24
100.0%

CPS Subgroup
Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Over DC Documents Chemicals
2
7
17
5.6%
17.9%
42.5%
34
32
23
94.4%
82.1%
57.5%
36
39
40
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

The next hypothesis looks at a political activity that is even more costly in terms
of time and effort. It states that CPS respondents are more likely than the general public
to attend political campaign events such as meetings, rallies, and speeches. This type of
behavior has become rare in modern America as indicated in cross-tabulation results
displayed above in Table 4.18a. Fewer than one in ten ANES respondents claims to
attend campaign meetings. Although the rate of attending political events is relatively
low among CPS respondents, it is more than double that of the ANES respondents. Chisquare testing exhibited in Table B.18a in Appendix B shows that the differences in
observed and expected counts are statistically significant. These results support the
hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely than the general public to participate in
campaign events.
However, a closer look at the data by CPS subgroup casts some doubt on the
relevance of this finding. More than sixty percent of the CPS respondents claiming to
attend campaign events are in one issue group. This may be testimony to the strength of
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the environmental movement in mobilizing its constituency. Members of the Toxic
Chemical subgroup are more than seven times as likely as members of the Aircraft Over
DC issue group to exhibit this behavior. Chi-square testing presented in Table B.18b
indicates that the differences in observed and expected counts for these subgroups are
statistically significant. There is less than one chance in a thousand that the substantial
differences in the subgroups are a product of random chance. Since one issue group is
below the ANES rate and three are above it, support for Hypothesis 18 is weakened.
However, based on the preliminary research for this project, far more than half of the
total comments by individuals during the study period were made on proposed
environmental rules. So, while environmentalists may be statistically different from
other issue groups in this sample, their preponderance in the aggregate of N&C
participants makes this behavior appear more typical than unusual for the average
individual making a comment on a proposed rule.

Table 4.19
Cross-tabulation for Display Campaign Sign
Display
Campaign
Sign
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

ANES

Sample
CPS

CPS Subgroup
Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Total Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals

220
49
269
7
20.6% 35.3% 22.3% 29.2%
846
90
936
17
79.4% 64.7% 77.7% 70.8%
1066
139
1205
24
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

11
30.6%
25
69.4%
36
100.0%

9
23.1%
30
76.9%
39
100.0%

22
55.0%
18
45.0%
40
100.0%

The next hypothesis examines the extent to which an individual might identify
with a party, candidate, or issue. While a person might anonymously attend a campaign
event, some people go out of their way to let others know where they stand on current
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political questions. Hypothesis 19 states that CPS respondents are more likely than the
general public to display campaign signs, buttons, or stickers. The results of the crosstabulation are exhibited in Table 4.19 on the previous page. When compared to the data
for the previous hypothesis, Putnam's lament for Americans coming together rings clear.
ANES respondents are nearly three times as likely to display a campaign sign as they are
to attend a political campaign meeting. It would appear that respondents find political
identification considerably less daunting than political association with their fellow
citizens.
The differences in rates of political identification between the samples are
substantial, with CPS respondents about forty two percent more likely than ANES
respondents to report this behavior. Chi-square testing displayed in Table B.19a confirms
that the differences in observed and expected counts are statistically significant. This
supports the hypothesis. N&C participants are more likely than the general public to
display a campaign sign, button, or sticker.
However, differences by subgroup might appear to undermine this support. When
CPS respondents are broken down by subgroup, dominance by the environmentalists
similar to that found in Hypothesis 18 is revealed. The environmentalists are
considerably more likely than other issue groups to participate in this type of political
activity. The Toxic Chemical subgroup exhibits more than double the rate of political
identification of the Re-entry Documents subgroup. Results of chi-square testing
exhibited in Table B.19b in Appendix B show that the differences in observed and
expected counts are statistically significant at the .05 level. It must be noted that
although the differences are significant, all CPS subgroups exhibit this behavior at higher
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levels than the ANES sample. Therefore, the finding that N&C participants are more
likely than the public to display campaign signs is not diminished.
The next three hypotheses look at checkbook issues. One may give her heart to
any number of issues, but she is likely to be more focused on those issues on which she
expends her limited financial resources. Hypothesis 20 states that CPS respondents are
more likely than the public to contribute to a candidate for political office. Crosstabulation data are presented on the following page in Table 4.20. While giving money
to political candidates is relatively uncommon on the whole, CPS respondents are more
than three times as likely to do so than ANES respondents. The results of chi-square
testing displayed in Table B.20a in Appendix B indicate that the differences in observed
and expected counts are statistically significant. This supports the hypothesis. N&C
participants are more likely than the general public to make contributions to candidates.

Table 4.20
Cross-tabulation for Contribute to Candidate
Contribute to
Candidate
Yes
No
Total

Sample
CPS Subgroup
CPS
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
102
46
148
5
8
10
23
9.6% 33.1% 12.3% 20.8%
22.2%
25.6%
57.5%
964
93
1057
19
28
29
17
90.4% 66.9% 87.7% 79.2%
77.8%
74.4%
42.5%
1066
139
1205
24
36
39
40
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

ANES
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent

A look at cross-tabulation results by CPS category reveals the familiar pattern of
unusually high rates of participation by the Toxic Chemical subgroup. More than half of
Toxic Chemical respondents report contributions to candidates. The environmentalists
are more than twice as likely as other issue groups in the CPS sample to contribute to a
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political candidate. Chi-square testing presented in Table B.20b in Appendix B confirms
that the differences in observed and expected counts by CPS subgroup are statistically
significant. This might tend to undermine support for Hypothesis 20. However, it must
be noted that the Animal Rights subgroup, which exhibits the lowest likelihood of
participation in this particular behavior, participates at more than twice the rate of the
ANES sample. Thus, the significant differences in the subgroups do not dilute the
substantial and significant difference between the ANES sample and any CPS issue
group.

Table 4.21
Cross-tabulation for Contributions to Party
Contribute
to Party
Yes
No
Total

Sample
CPS Subgroup
CPS
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
101
38
139
3
8
6
21
9.5% 27.3% 11.6% 12.5%
22.2%
15.4%
52.5%
963
101
1064
21
28
33
19
90.5% 72.7% 88.4% 87.5%
77.8%
84.6%
47.5%
1064
139
1203
24
36
39
40
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%
ANES

Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent

More than three decades ago, Broder (1972) sounded the warning that political
parties are in decline and political campaigns are becoming candidate centered. While
political parties have certainly lost many of their historic roles, their importance in
fundraising remains impressive. Data presented above in Table 4.21 suggest that rates of
contributions to candidates and political parties are remarkably similar for the ANES
sample. Although contribution rates to political parties dropped by six points for the CPS
sample, they remained almost three times that of the ANES sample. Chi-square testing
exhibited in Table B.21a in Appendix B confirms that the differences in observed and
expected frequencies between the samples are statistically significant. This substantial
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and significant differential supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely
than the general public to contribute to political parties.
Cross-tabulation data for CPS subgroups reveals that the rate of contribution
remains the same for the Aircraft Over DC subgroup and declines for other issue groups
as compared to contributions to political candidates. Even with this decline, the Toxic
Chemical respondents are two to four times as likely as the respondents of other CPS
issue groups to report contributions to political parties. As indicated in Table B.21b in
Appendix B, the differences in observed and expected counts between subgroups are
statistically significant. Such a lack of consistency might tend to deteriorate confidence
in support for this hypothesis. However, even the lowest performing CPS issue group
exhibited a twenty four percent higher rate of participation than the ANES sample. This
differential, combined with the substantial difference in the aggregate rate of
contributions to political parties and the sheer volume of environmentalist participation in
the N&C process, may serve to lessen concern for the viability of support for Hypothesis
21.

Table 4.22
Cross-tabulation for Contribute to Other Group
Contribute to
Other Group
Yes
No
Total

Sample
CPS Subgroup
CPS
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
67
49
116
2
15
7
25
6.3% 35.5%
9.6%
8.3%
41.7%
17.9%
64.1%
998
89
1087
22
21
32
14
93.7% 64.5% 90.4% 91.7%
58.3%
82.1%
35.9%
1065
138
1203
24
36
39
39
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%

ANES
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
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Results for the last two hypotheses demonstrate a low rate of contribution by the
ANES sample either to candidates for public office or political parties. The next
hypothesis extends this investigation into to the world of interest group politics.
Hypothesis 22 states that CPS respondents are more likely than the general public to
contribute to a group other than a political party that supports or opposes a candidate for
public office. Not surprisingly, cross-tabulation results presented above in Table 4.22
show a decline of about half in the rate of contributions for ANES respondents as
compared to their contribution rates to individual candidates and political parties. Only
about one in sixteen ANES respondents reports giving money to an association
supporting or opposing political candidates. For the CPS sample, this rate exceeds one in
three. Chi-square test results presented in Table B.22a indicate that the differences in
observed and expected frequencies for this variable are statistically significant. This
supports the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely than the general public to
give money to organizations that support or oppose political candidates.
Again, substantial differences are apparent among the CPS issue groups. The
Toxic Chemical issue group continues to rank highest in participation. However, the
Aircraft over DC subgroup emerges at a substantially higher level than it has in previous
variables dealing with contributions. These two subgroups rank highest in groupmembership (see Table 4.7) and in number of non-religious associations (see Table 4.8).
This points to the role of interest groups in fundraising for political purposes. As
indicated in chi-square results presented above in Table B.22b in Appendix B, the
differences in observed and expected counts are statistically significant. Support for
Hypothesis 22 is conditional and may vary as issue groups enter and exit the mix of N&C
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participants during a particular study period. However, this variation in rates of
participation tends to operate at substantially higher levels for all CPS subgroups than
those exhibited by the general public. Therefore, Hypothesis 22 is confirmed,
conditionally.
The next hypothesis looks at voting. More than eight out of ten ANES
respondents report voting in the 2004 election. Unfortunately, the Bureau of the Census
reports that only about sixty four percent of the voting age population actually voted.
The difference might be the result of an unrepresentative ANES sample. However, given
the care and expertise typical of this highly respected national polling organization, a
more likely explanation is self-presentational influences. Over-reporting of positive
behaviors and under-reporting of negative behaviors are routine features in the
environment of survey research. As noted previously, in the CPS survey, voting refers to
the 2006 midterm elections while the ANES survey question refers to the 2004
presidential election. Although the Census Bureau has not yet completed its report on the
2006 election as of this writing, it is fair to assert that midterm elections have
substantially lower turnout rates than presidential elections.

Table 4.23
Cross-tabulation for Vote
Vote
Count
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Total Count
Percent
Yes

Sample
CPS Subgroup
CPS
Total Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
441
132
573
20
36
37
39
82.1% 95.0% 84.8% 83.3% 100.0%
94.9%
97.5%
96
7
103
4
2
1
17.9%
5.0% 15.2% 16.7%
5.1%
2.5%
537
139
676
24
36
39
40
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

ANES
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Cross-tabulations results presented above in Table 4.23 indicate that, even with
this handicap, CPS respondents report outvoting ANES respondents by thirteen
percentage points. Chi-square testing presented above in Table B.23a in Appendix B
indicates that the differences in observed and expected counts are statistically significant.
The data support the hypothesis that N&C participants are more likely to vote than the
general public.
While there is some variation among CPS issue groups, voting rates are so high
that there are only seven subjects who indicated that they did not vote. Four of these are
in the Animal Rights subgroup. All of the respondents in the Aircraft Over DC issue
group claimed to have voted. As indicated in Table B.23b in Appendix B, the differences
may be statistically significant at the .05 level, but with half of the cells generating
expected values of less than five, the test is not reliable. So, since all subgroups report
higher levels of voting than the ANES sample, it is doubtful that any inter-group
differences can clearly be said to undermine this hypothesis.

Efficacy and Trust

Table 4.24
Group Statistics for People Like Me Don't Have Any Say
Sample/Subgroup
ANES
CPS
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals

Standard Standard
Number Mean Deviation Error Mean
1065
3.04
1.25
.004
139
3.59
1.12
.01
26
4.12
.86
.17
36
3.53
1.16
.19
39
3.36
1.20
.19
38
3.54
1.09
.18
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The final set of hypotheses examines the relationship of efficacy and trust to
participation in the N&C process. Hypothesis 24 states that CPS respondents are less
likely than the general public to agree with the statement that people like themselves do
not have much say in what government does. This variable tests efficacy. Measurement
for this variable is a five-point scale in which a score of one means strong agreement (low
efficacy) and a score of five means strong disagreement (high efficacy). Group statistics
displayed above in Table 4.24 demonstrate that ANES respondents are about fifteen
percent more likely than CPS respondents to agree with a statement indicating that they
have no say in government. This indicates a higher level of efficacy among CPS
respondents. The results of independent samples testing for this hypothesis presented in
Table B.24b in Appendix B reveal a violation of the homogeneity of variance
assumption. The t-statistic for equal variances not assumed is significant. There is less
than one possibility in one thousand that the differences in means happened by pure
chance. This supports Hypothesis 24. CPS respondents demonstrate higher levels of
efficacy than the ANES sample.
The data for CPS subgroups reveal substantial differences in means among the
issue groups. Unexpectedly, Animal Rights respondents, who rank at or near the bottom
of CPS subgroups in measures of political participation, display the highest levels of
efficacy. Re-entry Documents respondents who seem to be without any meaningful form
of interest group association report the lowest level. Given their responses to other
questions, it might be expected that the Animal Rights subgroup would perform closer to
the ANES mean. Perhaps their optimism is merely a result of their relatively low levels
of experience working in the pressure group arena. One-way analysis of variance data
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are presented in Table B.24b in Appendix B. For this set of issue groups, the differences
narrowly fail to achieve statistical significance. Given the substantial difference between
the lowest CPS subgroup and the ANES mean, the data confirm Hypothesis 24. Notice
and comment participants exhibit higher levels of efficacy than the general public.
The next hypothesis takes a look at the role of elections in making government
accountable to the people. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the
statement that elections make government pay attention to what the people think. Again,
a low score indicates agreement (trust government) and a high score indicates
disagreement (distrust government). Hypothesis 25 states that CPS respondents are less
likely than ANES respondents to agree with this statement. Group statistics for this
hypothesis are presented in Table 4.25 on the next page. As with the previous
hypothesis, the difference in means is substantial, this time about twenty five percent
higher for the CPS respondents. Results of an independent samples t-test presented in
Table B.25a indicate that the t-statistic for equal variances not assumed is statistically
significant. This supports Hypothesis 25. CPS respondents are more likely to disagree
that elections make government pay attention to the people.

Table 4.25
Group Statistics for Elections Make Government Pay Attention
Sample/Subgroup
ANES
CPS
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals

Number
1063
141
26
36
39
40

Mean

Standard Standard
Deviation Error Mean
2.03
1.27
.004
2.73
1.09
.009
2.77
1.11
.22
2.61
.96
.16
2.87
1.15
.18
2.68
1.16
.18

91
Descriptive statistics for the CPS issue groups indicate that the Re-entry
Documents issue group is the most negative about the ability of elections to make
government pay attention to the people, while the Aircraft Over DC subgroup is the most
positive. However, the range of means is much smaller than that presented for the
previous variable. Interestingly, the Animal Rights subgroup, which exhibited such high
levels of confidence in their own ability to make their voices heard by government, is not
nearly so convinced that they could do so through the electoral process. The results of a
one-way analysis of variance presented in Table B.25b in Appendix B reveal that the
differences in means fail to achieve statistical significance. The proximity of subgroup
means tends to reinforce support for Hypothesis 25. From these findings, it may be
concluded that N&C participants trust the electoral system, and thereby, the system of
representative democracy, less than does the general public.
The final hypothesis extends the investigation of assessments of the influence of
interest groups in formulating government policy. Hypothesis 26 states that CPS
respondents are more likely than ANES respondents to agree with the statement that
government is run by a few big interests. In this case, a low score is evidence of belief in
a strong influence of interest groups and a high score indicates belief in a lesser role.
Group statistics are displayed below in Table 4.26. CPS respondents are about fourteen
percent more likely than ANES respondents to agree with the statement. Results of an
independent samples t-test presented in Table B.26a indicate that the t-statistic for equal
variances not assumed is statistically significant at the .001 level. The means for the two
samples are both substantially and significantly different, supporting Hypothesis 26. CPS
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respondents are more likely than ANES respondents to agree that government is run by a
few big interests.

Table 4.26
Group Statistics for Government Run by a Few Big Interests
Sample/Subgroup
ANES
CPS
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals

Number
1025
141
26
36
39
40

Standard Standard
Deviation Error
Mean
2.65
1.97
.006
2.27
1.09
.009
2.31
1.05
.21
2.86
1.15
.19
2.23
1.01
.16
1.76
.89
.14

Mean

However, the means of the various issue groups demonstrate that there is a lack of
uniformity of opinion in the CPS sample. This time, it is the environmentalists, probably
the strongest non-business issue group in Washington, that scores the strongest agreement
with the statement. The Aircraft Over DC issue group, the next best organized of the
subgroups, shows the strongest disagreement, with a mean nearly forty percent higher
than the Toxic Chemical subgroup. So, apparently, the level of associational influence is
not the only driver of this variable. Results of a one-way analysis of variance are
presented in Table B.26b in Appendix B. As might be expected, the substantial
difference between the extremes is sufficient to achieve statistical significance.
The results of multiple comparisons of means by CPS subgroup are displayed in
Table B.26c in Appendix B. A pattern of significant polar differences is apparent and the
difference in polar means is statistically significant. However, the means of the middle
groups are not significantly different from each other or from either pole. The Toxic
Chemical subgroup mean drags down the CPS average. Given the high level of
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participation by environmental groups in the notice and comment process and the
substantial differences between the environmentalists and other issue groups, it is likely
that such divisions are typical of most samples of participants. Since this sample has one
issue group exhibiting a mean above the ANES mean and three below the ANES mean,
support for Hypothesis 26 is compromised. What can be stated with reasonable
confidence is that environmentalist, probably the single largest segment of N&C
participants, are more likely than the general public to mistrust the influence of big
interest groups on government policy, in spite of the fact that they are themselves the
dutiful soldiers of a big and powerful interest group.
Table 4.27 on the following page summarizes findings for the twenty-six
hypotheses tested. For the entire sample, all hypotheses are supported at the sample level
except for gender and watching local television news. However, subgroup results are not
as consistent. For hypotheses concerning age, reading the newspaper, attending political
campaign meetings, and opinions of special interest group control of the government, the
range of subgroup scores includes the ANES score. This demonstrates that, in some
aspects, N&C participants are not homogeneous. The issue involved in the proposed rule
does affect characteristics of participants, but not in most cases.
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Table 4.27
Summary of Findings

Hypothesis
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Variable
Age
Marital Status
Education
Household Income
Race
Gender
Association Membership
Number of Associations
Watch National News
Watch Local News
Read Newspaper
Internet Access
Contact Government Official
Attend Public Meeting
Discuss Politics
Political Talk Radio
Influence Others
Attend Campaign Meetings
Campaign Signs
Contribute to Candidate
Contribute to Party
Contribute to Other Political Group
Vote
People Like Me Don't Have Say
Elections Make Government Pay Attention
Government Controlled by Special Interests

Expectation
Older
Married
Higher
Higher
White
Male
Member
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
More
Disagree
Disagree
Agree

Supported
for Sample
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Supported for
Subgroups
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes*
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes*
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes*
Yes*
Yes*
Yes*
Yes*
Yes
Yes
No

* Differences in subgroups are significant. However, subgroup scores exceed the ANES
score.

In addition to gathering data for hypothesis testing, several survey questions
explore aspects of participation for which there are presently no theories. This data is
presented in the following chapter to provide an enhanced picture of both the N&C
participant and the process of participation.
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Chapter 5
Supplemental Information On Citizen Participation Study Subjects

The foregoing completes the portion of this study addressing the testing
hypothesis. Several other questions are included in the CPS survey concerning the
experiences and attitudes of participants in the N&C process. Since these variables are
not available for the ANES sample, no hypotheses are offered. However, these variables
do provide important insights into administrative issues and several variables supplement
findings for various hypotheses.

Table 5.1
Cross-tabulation for Get Information From Government
Get Information From
Government
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

CPS Subgroup
Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
11
24
28
10
44.0%
70.6%
80.0%
32.3%
14
10
7
21
56.0%
29.4%
20.0%
67.7%
25
34
35
31
100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%

Total
73
58.4%
52
41.6%
125
100.0%

Table 5.1a above provides a summary of the experiences of participants in the
rule-making process in securing information from government sources. Overall, N&C
participants appear to be able to get sufficient information from government sources. The
relatively low percentage getting government information in the Animal Rights may be
due to either the relative inexperience of the participants or the simple fact that the
Department of Agriculture does not keep specific data on things that it does not regulate
specifically. Substantial majorities of participants in both the Aircraft Over DC and the
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Re-entry Documents issue groups seemed to find sufficient information from government
sources. The one group that demonstrates a serious lack of confidence in government
sources is the Toxic Chemical subgroup. This issue group is both the best educated and
most experienced politically. However, previous confrontational and adversarial
relations with the EPA and business concerns may foster a climate of distrust among
individual issue group members. Results of a chi-square test presented in Table C.1 in
Appendix C indicate that the differences between the subgroups in observed and expected
frequencies are statistically significant. This means that the sufficiency of government
information varies among the various issue groups. So, no general statement can be
made concerning the availability of government information on issues concerning
proposed agency rules. It appears that the subject matter of the proposed rule and the
nature of the issue group may affect perceptions of information adequacy.
Table 5.2
Cross-tabulation for Organization Ask You to Make Comment
Ask to Make
Comment
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

CPS Subgroup
Animal
Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights
Over DC Documents Chemicals
17
30
3
30
65.4%
83.3%
8.3%
76.9%
9
6
33
9
34.6%
16.7%
91.7%
23.1%
26
36
36
39
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Total
80
58.4%
57
41.6%
137
100.0%

The next question addresses the role of associations in promoting participation in
the N&C process. Table 5.2 below displays the outcome of cross-tabulation analysis for
this question. The Re-entry Documents subgroup has a substantially lower rate of
interest group contact than other subgroups. This may be the result of relatively low rates
of organizational membership displayed in Hypothesis 7, or it may simply be a reflection
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of the lack of a driving interest group in this issue area. Compared to other issue groups,
Re-entry Documents respondents score midrange in age, education, and income, and only
slightly higher in rates of marriage. They score low to midrange in all measures of
political activity. But, Re-entry Documents respondents score the lowest of the CPS
subgroups in associational membership. Other than their interest in their own personal
travel plans, no connecting force is identified. A chi-square test presented in Table C.2 in
Appendix C above shows that the differences in observed and expected counts is
statistically significant. So, no general statement can be made about the role of interest
groups in soliciting participation in the N&C process. However, the rates of solicitation
in three of four of the issue categories points to an important role for interest groups in
particular issue areas.

Table 5.3
Cross-tabulation for Contact Elected Official About Issue
Contact Elected
Official About Issue
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

CPS Subgroup
Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
11
21
26
23
42.3%
58.3%
66.7%
63.9%
15
15
13
13
57.7%
41.7%
33.3%
36.1%
26
36
39
36
100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%

Total
81
59.1%
56
40.9%
137
100.0%

A central claim of the Refounding Movement is that direct citizen participation
empowers groups that presently have no political voice. Cross-tabulation data presented
above in Table 5.3 offers a strong evidence of exactly the opposite outcome. Even
though the proposed rule is an administrative decision rather than a decision by elected
officials, a substantial majority of CPS respondents indicate that they have contacted an
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elected official concerning this issue. Interestingly, the issue group with the lowest levels
of political sophistication exhibits the lowest level of contacting elected officials as might
be expected, but the Re-entry Documents subgroup, the issue group with the lowest level
of interest group motivation, has the highest level of contacting. A chi-square test
displayed in Table C.3 in Appendix C indicates that differences in observed and expected
counts fail to achieve statistical significance. Therefore, it may be concluded that N&C
participants across a wide range of areas of concern contact elected officials concerning
issues raised in agency rulemaking. So, even without a notice and comment process, it
appears that these citizen participants have political voice and they know how to use it.

Table 5.4
Cross-tabulation for Made Previous Comments
Made
Previous
Comments
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

CPS Subgroup
Animal
Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights
Over DC Documents Chemicals
14
24
25
37
53.8%
66.7%
67.6%
92.5%
12
12
12
3
46.2%
33.3%
32.4%
7.5%
26
36
37
40
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Total
100
71.9%
39
28.1%
139
100.0%

Not only do CPS respondents contact elected officials at high rates, they also
make multiple comments. Cross-tabulation results presented above in Table 5.4 indicate
that a substantial majority of N&C participants have made previous comments. More
than nine out of ten Toxic Chemical respondents report previous comments and a
majority of the much less politically active Animal Rights respondents report the same.
While the chi-square test results displayed in Table C.4 in Appendix C indicate that the
differences in observed and expected frequencies are statistically significant, those
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differences are merely in the size of the majority. Consistently, most participants in the
notice and comment process are repeat participants. Since the total number of
participants for all proposed rules is very small in comparison to the population of
potential participants, this level of repetitive participatory behavior suggests that making
comments to proposed agency rules is something of a clique behavior.

Table 5.5
Cross-tabulation for Same or Different Issue
Same Issue
or
Different
Count
Same
Percent
Different Count
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

Animal
Rights
3
21.4%
11
78.6%
14
100.0%

CPS Subgroup
Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Over DC Documents Chemicals
4
2
16
16.0%
8.0%
42.1%
21
23
22
84.0%
92.0%
57.9%
25
25
38
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Total
25
24.5%
77
75.5%
102
100.0%

It is possible that this clique behavior is merely a function of the particular issues
involved in the rule proposals selected for this study. If this were so, a set of
environmentalists would make comments on environmental rule proposals and a different
set of pet lovers would make comments on proposals concerning pets. However, crosstabulation data presented above in Table 5.5 exhibit strong evidence to the contrary.
Among the seven out of ten CPS respondents who reported making previous comments,
more than three-fourths reported making comments on proposed rules involving different
types of issues. As might be expected, the environmentalists, represented by the Toxic
Chemical subgroup, are the least likely to make comments on different issues, and the
much less well-organized Re-entry Documents subgroup is the most likely to address
other issues. This is another indication of the impact of associational influences on
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citizen participation in the N&C process. A chi-square test displayed in Table C.5 in
Appendix C indicates that differences in observed and expected frequencies are
statistically significant. However, as is the case with the previous variable, those
significant differences are merely in the size of the majority. Again, N&C respondents
exhibit high rates of making comments on different types of rules and they tend to do so
with relative consistency.

Table 5.6a
Cross-tabulation for How Comment Made

How Comment Made
Agency Web Page
Regulations.gov
e-mail
Regular Mail
Other
Don't Remember
Total

Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent

CPS Subgroup
Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
8
7
10
6
30.8%
19.4%
25.6%
15.0%
2
1
5.6%
2.6%
12
22
17
28
46.2%
61.1%
43.6%
70.0%
5
3
7
1
19.2%
8.3%
17.9%
2.5%
2
1
5.1%
2.5%
1
2
2
4
3.8%
5.6%
5.1%
10.0%
26
36
39
40
100.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0%

Total
31
22.0%
3
2.1%
79
56.0%
16
11.3%
3
2.1%
9
6.4%
141
100.0%

As noted previously, the last two administrations have focused on making
government more accessible via the Internet. Cross-tabulation data presented above in
Table 5.6a provide evidence of the success of that effort. Only slightly more than one in
ten respondents report making their comment by regular mail. While participants have
moved substantially to the Internet, they may not be moving in the direction most
efficient for agencies. The majority of respondents report making their comments via e-
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mail. This type of correspondence can be processed much more efficiently than paper.
However, each comment requires additional handling to put the comment into a database.
Agency web pages and the regulations.gov overlay network would do this automatically.
Unfortunately, use of these web sites is relatively light, especially for the regulations.gov
overlay. Among the issue groups, the environmentalists are the least likely to use the
more fully automated systems, possibly because these enhancements were not available
when the environmental movement began using the Internet.

Table 5.6b
Cross-tabulation for Comment Made Via Internet
Comment Made
Via Internet
Count
Yes
Percent
Count
No
Percent
Count
Total
Percent

CPS Subgroup
Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
20
31
28
34
76.9%
86.1%
71.8%
85.0%
6
5
11
6
23.1%
13.9%
28.2%
15.0%
26
36
39
40
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Total
113
80.1%
28
19.9%
141
100.0%

Due to the number of categories of answers, calculation of statistical significance
for the data in Table 5.6a is problematic. So, the number of categories is reduced to two
in Table 5.6b above. Eight out of ten respondents report using the Internet in some
fashion. The results of Chi-square testing are presented in Table C.6 in Appendix C. The
data indicate that the differences in observed and expected counts among the issue groups
fail to achieve statistical significance. The Internet is clearly the medium of choice for
making comments to proposed agency rules for a wide range of issue groups.
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Table 5.7
Cross-tabulation for Ease of Making Comment by CPS Subgroup
Ease of
Making
Comment
Easy
Moderate
Difficult
Total

Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent
Count
Percent

CPS Subgroup
Animal Aircraft Re-entry
Toxic
Rights Over DC Documents Chemicals
20
27
26
34
76.9%
75.0%
66.7%
85.0%
6
8
13
5
23.1%
22.2%
33.3%
12.5%
1
1
2.8%
2.5%
26
36
39
40
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Total
107
75.9%
32
22.7%
2
1.4%
141
100.0%

Another piece of good news for agency planners is that three out of four citizenparticipants report that making their comment is easy. As indicated in cross-tabulation
results displayed in Table 5.7 above, only two CPS respondents describe the experience
as difficult. As expected, those experienced respondents of the Toxic Chemical group are
the most likely to describe the experience as easy. Given the relatively small differences
in issue group results, it is not surprising that chi-square testing displayed in Table C.7 in
Appendix C indicates that the differences in observed and expected counts fail to achieve
statistical significance. N&C participants routinely find the process of making comments
to proposed agency rules to be relatively easy. However, the question of how much of
this ease is a product of the government's efforts to facilitate participation and how much
is a function of interest group efforts remains unanswered.
The picture that emerges from the foregoing data is that of a band of experienced
political activists who use a specialized set of skills to achieve political objectives in a
variety of issue venues. Based on this data and the findings from the previous chapter,
the compatibility of the notice and comment process with the democratic values liberty,
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equality, and fairness is accessed in the next and final chapter. Also, various proposed
reforms are evaluated.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion

Summary of Findings

Summarizing the findings in the proceeding two chapters should put the question
of this study into an appropriately narrow focus. Socioeconomic and demographic data
indicate that, compared to the average citizen of the American republic, participants in
the notice and comment process are substantially and significantly different in aspects
that usually indicate a higher social class. N&C participants are: 1) about six years older
than the mean of the ANES sample; 2) about thirty five percent more likely to be
married; 3) about twice as likely to hold college or advanced degrees; 4) seventy eight
percent more likely to be in the top three income groups; 5) twenty eight percent more
likely to be White; and, 6) very unlikely to be Black.
Association data indicate that N&C participants are better networked than the
general public. Participants in the N&C process are much more likely to belong to a nonreligious organization. Among those who do belong to such an association, N&C
participants are more likely to belong to substantially more such organizations. Data on
sources and uses of information indicate that notice and comment participants are much
better informed than the general public. They are more likely to watch the national news
on television, read a daily newspaper, and have access to the Internet.
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Data on political activity indicate that notice and comment participants are among
our most active political participants. Compared to the general public, they are: 1) more
than three times as likely to contact a public official about a problem; 2) much more
likely to attend a public meeting; 3) more than three times as likely to discuss politics
with family and friends; 4) substantially more likely to listen to political talk radio; 5)
much more likely to try to influence the vote of another person; 6) nearly three times as
likely to attend a political campaign meeting; 7) more than half again as likely to display
a campaign sign; 8) more than three times as likely to contribute to a candidate for public
office; 9) about three times as likely to contribute to a political party; 10) nearly six times
as likely to contribute to an organization, other than a political party, that attempts to
influence elections; and, 11) even more likely to vote. Importantly, the attitudes toward
the political system of notice and comment participants differ substantially from those of
the general public. N&C participants exhibit much greater efficacy. They are much less
likely to indicate faith in the system of elections. Finally, and understandably, they are
much less likely to be concerned about the power of special interest groups.
Although there is some variation among the subgroups, the range of variations
usually fall beyond the 2004 NES mean. But, it may be argued that while those who
participate in agency rulemaking are unrepresentative of the general public, citizens who
participate in elections are also unrepresentative of those who do not. This is true. But
N&C participants are not only unrepresentative of the public, they are also
unrepresentative of voters. Data presented on the following page in Table 6.1 compare
results of testing the original hypotheses using the entire ANES sample with results using
only those ANES respondents who said they voted in the 2004 election. If the problem
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with representative democracy is that voters are not representative, direct citizen
participation in federal agency rulemaking is an unrealistic reform because it is even
more unrepresentative.

Table 6.1
Summary of Findings - Comparison of Results for Entire ANES and ANES Voters Only

Hypothesis
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Variable
Age
Marital Status
Education
Household Income
Race
Gender
Association Membership
Number of Associations
Watch National News
Watch Local News
Read Newspaper
Internet Access
Contact Government Official
Attend Public Meeting
Discuss Politics
Political Talk Radio
Influence Others
Attend Campaign Meetings
Campaign Signs
Contribute to Candidate
Contribute to Party
Contribute to Other Political Group
Vote
People Like Me Don't Have Say
Elections Make Government Pay Attention
Government Controlled by Special Interests

Supported
for Entire
Expectation ANES
Older
Yes
Married
Yes
Higher
Yes
Higher
Yes
White
Yes
Male
No
Member
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
No
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
More
Yes
Disagree
Yes
Disagree
Yes
Agree
Yes

Supported for
ANES Voters
Only
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Not Applicable
Yes
Yes
Yes

None of these findings are new. In fact, theories explaining political participation
identified in several generations of quantitative political research are supported by these
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findings. So, our theories of what drives political participation are sound. What remains
is to apply this well documented knowledge to the particular question at hand and draw
rational inferences.

Implications of Findings for Democratic Values

Liberty is important. Arguably, the protection of individual liberty was the single
most important goal of the Framers. And, certainly, participation in the notice and
comment process is an exercise of liberty for the participant. All individuals and
organizations, not merely citizens, may make a comment on any proposed rule, or they
may choose not to do so. However, as shown below, that does not demonstrate that
participation in this process is necessary for individual liberty.
The data indicate that N&C participants generally avail themselves of numerous
opportunities to exercise their liberty to influence public policy by outperforming the
average citizen in all of the eleven aspects political participation described above. So,
one must ask if one more way of demonstrating their preferences is really necessary to
the political liberty of the notice and comment participant or of any citizen who might at
some point in the future choose to participate in this process? If that particular avenue of
expressing her opinion were unavailable, is it reasonable to assume that a person so
endowed with the political skills and experience that is common among these participants
might not simply write a letter to her representative or call her senator? The data indicate
that there is a strong likelihood that she would. In fact, by the time she decides to make
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her comment, she has frequently exercised other means of participation to express her
opinion on the issue at hand.
If participation in the notice and comment process is not essential to political
liberty, is it necessary to political equality? Here, the data speak unambiguously. Not
only is this form of participation unnecessary for political equality, it virtually guarantees
inequality. Only a very small percentage of Americans actually participate in this process
and the data indicate that those who do are drawn from the higher ranks of our social
order. Schattschneider observed that those who make the effort to have their voices
heard tend to be from the more advantaged class. He warned advocates of mass citizen
participation that, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with
a strong upper-class accent” (p. 35). Even the most ardent proponents of increasing
public participation in agency decision making acknowledge this most predictable
outcome. Camilla Stivers, one of the original drafters of the Blacksburg Manifesto
laments that:

The advantage pluralism imparts to the organized and well equipped
makes it difficult to envision a policy substantial role for ordinary citizens,
one that goes beyond the advisory committee or coproduction. Oligarchy
is ubiquitous, and cooption appears inevitable (Wamsley, et al, p. 251).

Citizens participate in public affairs when the interest of the community is
demonstrably linked to the interest of the individual (Burtt). Data indicate that those
persons with more interests feel the pull of multiple links and tend to participate more
frequently and in more ways. From those experiences, they hone the skills necessary to
become influential in the political process. In contrast, the disadvantaged have fewer
interests and, thereby, fewer links drawing them into the public sphere. Thus, the
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disadvantaged suffer from deficiencies in the basic skills and political experiences
necessary for effective participation, especially in more advanced political activities such
as influencing the federal bureaucracy.
The remaining democratic value to be considered is fairness. Rawls (1971)
argues that the principal of equality may be violated so long as the weakest members of
society benefit. So, it might be argued that inequality in participation in federal agency
rulemaking is justified because it benefits the disadvantaged. The data provide no
support for this assertion. Four rule proposals were selected for this study based on
criteria described previously. The first deals with the regulation of the transportation and
sale of ferrets. While some disadvantaged persons might possibly own a ferret, is such
regulation among those issues most frequently associated with the plight of the poor? All
of the commenters randomly selected for this study favored additional regulation. It is
hard to conceive of a way in which the restrictions proposed in this rule that would
probably increase the cost of these rather exotic pets might substantially improve the lot
of the poor.
The next proposed rule would regulate private aircraft and general aviation
airports in proximity to Washington, D. C. in order to limit opportunities for terrorists
attacks against the nation's capital. Few disadvantaged people own or travel by private
aircraft. Nor are they especially affected by restrictions on general aviation airports.
However, many disadvantaged persons rely on some form of government assistance.
Any incident of mass destruction in the federal district could severely disrupt the
provision of government benefits. It is revealing that those who commented on this rule
proposal were almost unanimous in their opposition to the proposed regulation of private
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aircraft in the federal district. This subgroup had the highest percentage of respondents
with family incomes over $120,000 and the lowest percentage with family incomes
below $30,000. More than two-thirds of respondents reported family incomes above
$80,000. While it is easy to see how the affluent are using the N&C process to protect
their interest, it is difficult to visualize how any disadvantaged person might be positively
affected by reductions in restrictions of the use of private aircraft that might hamper
security efforts against terrorist threats to the federal district.
The next rule proposal would require a passport for re-entry to the United States
when returning from selected locations in North America as part of the effort to make
entrance by terrorists more difficult. The overwhelming majority of commenters opposed
this rule. Many commenters on this proposal stated that they were retired persons on
fixed incomes and could not afford a passport for international travel. Interestingly, more
than two-thirds of respondents in this subgroup reported family incomes of $50,000 or
greater. It is almost certain that requiring a passport when none has been required in the
past would increase the cost of international travel. Yet, it is somewhat difficult to
understand how international travel would constitute a substantial portion of the family
budgets of the truly disadvantaged. Again, it is much easier to understand how the
disadvantaged would be the most vulnerable to economic disruptions caused by terrorist
intrigues. So, to the extent that requiring a passport might reduce the likelihood of
terrorist access, the proposed rule would appear to benefit the disadvantaged.
The final rule proposal would change reporting requirements for toxic chemicals
stored at business locations. As with the previous case, commenters overwhelmingly
opposed the change. Again, more than two-thirds of respondents in this subgroup
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reported family incomes of $50,000 or more. While one might offer the argument that
the disadvantaged would be in greatest jeopardy from the accidental release of toxic
chemicals, this proposed change merely affected the form on which the chemicals would
be reported and the reporting interval. Any increase in risk for the public would be
extremely small, if not imaginary. Likewise, any savings the businesses might gain from
the change are projected to be minimal. In this case, there would be very little risk and
very little reward for the public in general or the disadvantaged, and this may be an
anomaly. Socioeconomic data from the Toxic Chemicals subgroup support a postulate
that concern for the environment is a middle class phenomenon. While the exact
relationship between environmental regulation and economic outcomes is a controversial
subject, it appears that the disadvantaged bear greater burdens from environmental
reforms in terms of lost job opportunities and achieve fewer tangible benefits (Jaffe et al,
1995).
So, the data provide no substantial evidence of benefit for the disadvantaged.
There is not a single case in which the actions of the more advantaged citizens who
participate in the notice and comment process may be seriously construed as doing
anything of substance to improve the lot of the disadvantaged. Perhaps this is due to an
unintended bias in the selection process for the rule proposals. After all, the number of
comments was the primary consideration for selection of a proposed rule. Rule proposals
which attract a large number of comments are unusual. Kerwin reports that most
proposed rules deal with narrow business issues and many garner few comments. So,
while this study cannot exclude the possibility that some set of advantaged commenters
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might do something to help some disadvantaged person or group at some time, it does
provide evidence of the unlikelihood of such an outcome.
Public participation in agency decision-making is not essential to liberty. It is
destructive of equality, and no evidence is found demonstrating an impact on improving
the lot of the disadvantaged. So, why is public participation hawked by politicians and
public administrators as the panacea for America's ills? In both cases, the answer may be
nothing more than self-interest. Politicians strive for reelection. When decisions are
made by many, responsibility is divided and accountability is uncertain. Likewise,
agencies compete for the allocation of scarce resources. Influential clients lobby
Congress to increase allotments to agencies providing their succor.

Too Much of A Good Thing

Political analyst Fareed Zakaria (2004) was born and raised in India. So, he views
America through the eyes of an immigrant, not wedded to the status quo through
patriotism or pride of history. Zakaria observes that American politicians are masters of
pandering, filling their public statements with praise of the "... wisdom, courage,
rectitude, and all-around greatness of the American people" (p. 167). He argues that
public participation is a good thing, but America suffers from too much of a good thing.
As barriers to public participation have fallen at all levels of government, the
public has responded by expressing in public opinion polls considerably lower levels of
trust in government. Most importantly, as trust has declined, voting rates have dropped,
in spite of substantial efforts to increase voting participation through such structural
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reforms as the Motor Voter Act and abolition of Jim Crow laws. To Zakaria, this decline
poses a dangerous problem for the republic.
Voting is not only the one universal act of citizenship in a free society, it is
also one of the least demanding... Disenchantment with their political
system is palpable in the way Americans vote, respond to public opinion
polls, write letters to the editor, talk on television, and indeed express
themselves anywhere in any form (p. 163).
Zarkaria blames this American malaise on what he calls the democratization of
politics.
Since the 1960s most aspects of American politics - political parties,
legislatures, administrative agencies, and even courts - have opened
themselves up to greater public contact and influence in a conscious effort
to become more democratic in structure and spirit. And curiously, more
than any other, this change seems to coincide with the decline in standing
of these very institutions (p. 166).
However, the public sees the problem in exactly the opposite light. When survey
respondents read a statement that "nobody listens to people like me," it appears to be an
accurate assessment of political institutions to many Americans. And, Zarakia thinks
that, for the average person, this may be true.
There is truth in these observations, in the sense that organized groups special interests - now run Washington, but what Americans often do not
realize is that this is a direct consequence of the changes of the last few
decades. The more open a system becomes, the more easily it can be
penetrated by money, lobbyists, and fanatics. What has changed in
Washington is not that politicians have closed themselves off from the
American people and are unwilling to hear their pleas. It is that they do
scarcely anything but listen to the American people. (p. 166).

All the King's Horses and All the King's Men

So, not only does public participation in agency rulemaking fail to deliver on
democratic values, the general effect of too much public participation may very well be
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to weaken representative democracy. To reverse this trend would require political
leadership and courage. Both are unlikely in a polarized political culture in which the
balance may shift with one ill-timed faux pas. Besides, political participation, while
often an extra-constitutional adjunct to representative democracy, has become a valued
component of American democracy. Any effort to reduce it would be seen as an assault
on individual liberty. Equally important, public input is necessary in the complex
administrative state. As government attempts to enter more areas previously reserved to
the private sector or the individual, frequently at the behest of its clients, it needs
information. Certainly, representatives and senators need input on priorities and
alternatives. Likewise, agencies that are charged with determining the details of
regulation must have some means of gathering information from the individuals and
groups they regulate.
A quick look at the U. S. Department of Transportation docket clarifies this need.
Various agencies within the department are, as of this writing, accepting comments on a
variety of rule proposals. FAA-2007-27390 would provide regulations for amateur
rocket activities. FAA-2007-28172 would certify the General Electric Company's CF680C2A5T turbofan engine for commercial airline use. FRA-2007-28699 would allow the
modification of a signaling system in use by the Canadian National Railway Company.
NHTSA-2007-28138 would modify standards for a tire quality grading system. PHMSA2007-28136 provides safety regulations for hazardous liquids pipelines transporting
ethanol and other bio-fuels (Department of Transportation). Similarly, dozens of other
agencies are considering a multitude of rules. Given the resource limits imposed on
agencies by budget constraints, how might any agency reside sufficient expertise to
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perform the tasks assigned to it in such wide-ranging rulemaking without drawing on
private sources?
The notice and comment process provides not only access to information but also
a viable avenue for participation for interested members of the public. Also, from public
participation, agencies stake a claim to institutional legitimacy. So, how might we fix
Humpty Dumpty in such a way that the process and the public policy outcomes have a
positive impact on liberty, equality, and fairness? One reform that will not be considered
is limiting congressional delegation to administrative agencies. As stated earlier, the
complex regulatory state is a matter of fact, not an alternative. We are where we find
ourselves. So, only reforms addressing the notice and comment process are considered.
The APA provides for both the informal rulemaking associated with the notice
and comment process and formal rulemaking in which a more adversarial process is
required. In truth, the more relaxed procedures of informal rulemaking have fallen into
disuse. Harter (1982) identifies the inability to establish consensus on the appropriate
mix of discretion and procedural constraint as the driver of what he calls hybrid
rulemaking. He argues that hybrid rulemaking has effectively replaced informal
rulemaking and has become a surrogate for direct participation in the political decisions.
Harter points to defects in the adversarial process of both formal and hybrid
rulemaking. First, both agencies and interested parties take extreme positions so that as
the process pushes them toward a more relaxed position, they will not loose what they
consider to be essential points. Next, participants are less likely to make full disclosure
of information because some data might undermine their position in subsequent litigation.
This fear of the almost certain litigation that follows rulemaking causes the agency and
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the interested parties to raise more issues than are necessary to resolve the matter at hand
because all parties see a need to build a defensible record. Interested parties talk to the
agency, not to each other, and seldom are allowed to reach a mutually acceptable
compromise. Finally, all parties engage in extra research activities so as to be able to
defend their positions against any attack. Harter concludes that these factors cause high
costs for all parties and extended duration for the rulemaking process.
One of the more radical reforms implemented to date is negotiated rulemaking.
Noting the strong support for this reform both in Congress and in the Oval Office,
Coglianese (2005) describes the procedure and its goals as an adjunct to informal
rulemaking.
Negotiated rulemaking supplements the notice-and-comment procedures
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) with a negotiation process that
takes place before an agency issues a proposed regulation. The agency
establishes a committee comprised of representatives from regulated
firms, trade associations, citizens groups, and other affected organizations,
as well as members of the agency staff. The committee meets publicly to
negotiate the proposed rule. If the committee reaches consensus, the
agency typically adopts the consensus rule as its proposed rule and then
proceeds according to the notice-and-comment procedures specified in the
APA (p. 1).

Harter argues that in negotiated rulemaking, the direct participation of the parties
reduces the cost and delay of current rulemaking by directly involving more decision
makers and fewer intermediaries. This allows decision makers to focus on substantive
issues rather than building a record for litigation. However, the applicability of this
method is limited to those cases in which compromise is possible, and Harter points out
that many regulations fall into the category of winner-take-all.
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But, Harter argues that, where used appropriately, the resulting regulations would
be superior to the products of more adversarial processes.
Direct participation in rulemaking through negotiations is preferable to
entrusting the decision to the wisdom and judgment of the agency, which
is essential under the basic provisions of the APA, or to relying on more
formal, structured method of hybrid rulemaking in which it is difficult for
anyone to make the careful trade offs necessary for enlightened regulation.
A regulation that is developed by and has the support of the respective
interests would have a political legitimacy that regulations developed
under any other process arguably lack (p. 2).

Looking at negotiated rulemaking after it was firmly established as a preferred
option for federal agencies, Coglianese found no support for claims that this reform
would reduce either the duration of rulemaking or the likelihood of litigation. In fact,
negotiated rules made by the EPA, the agency that has used this method most frequently,
took longer and produced more legal challenges than rules the agency made through its
more traditional procedures. But, whether or not it delivers the advantages promised,
what impact might negotiated rulemaking have on democratic values?
Since the agency is required only to invite key stakeholders to participate in the
negotiation, the liberty of any other individual to participate would be limited. From the
standpoint of equality, it would absolutely assure inequality because the term "key
stakeholder" seldom translates into wage earner, taxpayer, or disadvantaged person.
Even if one or more public members were to be included in the mix, it is most doubtful
that disinterested non-experts would be sufficiently motivated and prepared to contest
with principals possessing vastly superior resources and motivation.
So, would these principals, in spite of the inequality of their selection, be expected
to act in the best interest of the disadvantaged? Since there is little empirical evidence
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that President Reagan's trickle-down economics would apply to the more narrow case of
rich and powerful principals of negotiated rulemaking, this is a question that turns on
assessments of human nature. John Locke (1988), considered by the Framers to be
something of an expert in that area, reminds us, "...That it is unreasonable for Men to be
Judges in their own Cases, that Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their
Friends: and on the other side, that Ill Nature, Passion and Revenge will carry them too
far in punishing others..." (p. 275). According to social contract theory, this is the very
reason that men voluntarily leave the state of nature and form government, "... to restrain
the partiality and violence of Men" (p. 276). William West (2004) describes negotiated
rulemaking as, "... a corporatist abdication of public authority to private interests" (p. 74).
If this is an accurate assessment, government's abdication puts the general public into a
virtual state of nature vis-á-vie those deciding their own cases. It is most doubtful that
lambs will fare well in a contest with lions.
One of the more radical reforms to receive any serious discussion involves
creating a separate agency to specialize in securing public comment for the rules
proposals of all other agencies. Cuèllar sees the problem with public participation as one
of differing levels of technical and political sophistication.
An independent agency could be created to run public consultations to
supplement existing rulemaking regulations. It could use random or
stratified random sampling to select people to consult, either during notice
and comment or earlier in the design of regulatory programs. It could
weigh and use various procedures to structure the provision of information
to participants. Lawyers working as 'regulatory public defenders' for the
independent agency could articulate the different views of the people
consulted for inclusion in the rulemaking record, thereby helping to
remedy sophistication deficits (p. 491).
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This is an interesting proposal if for no other reason than it attempts to integrate
the efforts of lawyers, social scientists, and bureaucrats to create something of a public
opinion jury on highly technical matters. While it is most doubtful that the existing
agencies would support any effort to reduce their control of their rulemaking, probably
the most glaring defect in practically applying such a proposal is not a sophistication
deficit, although one certainly exists. Even if these regulatory public defenders could
bring average or below average citizens up to speed on cutting edge technological
questions, they would almost certainly lack the capacity to engender in these randomly
selected public participants an interest in doing so. Most citizens, especially the
disadvantaged, simply are not interested in the details or technology of some randomly
selected rule proposal.
Likewise, most citizens do not live in or around Washington, D. C. So, it would
be necessary to disrupt the lives of ordinary citizens, take them far from home, educate
them on matters for which they probably have no interest, and hold them in this state for
some extended period of time. Either those selected would appear as hired participants,
with all of the bias issues that might entail, or they would be forced to serve through
some process of compulsion not revealed in Cuèllar's proposal. This proposal might
improve the chances of equality through the use of social science, but at what expense to
individual liberty and fairness?
Cuèllar also proposes the use of on-line surveys to facilitate the process of
gathering public opinion. While that idea might avoid the rather unappealing prospects
of either compulsory public participation or citizen participation for hire, it would still
depend on the interest of participants. Average and less advantaged citizens do not sense
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that they have a dog in the fight when agencies decide complex technical issues like the
certification of turbofan aircraft engines or tire grading systems.
Often agencies are required to make rules on technical issues where there is no
consensus within the scientific community. Harter describes a proposal for a science
court as a means to resolve such technical issues. A tribunal of experts would be
assembled by the agency and interested parties would present their evidence in an
adversarial manner. Based on the weight of evidence, the science court would decide the
issue and the agency would use their findings as the factual basis for its regulation.
On the surface, a science court appears to offer a reform that might actually speed
up the rulemaking process at little cost to liberty, equality, or fairness. Making rules
based on good science sounds like good policy for everyone. But, there are at least two
problems. First, there is the selection process for the judges. The agency must select
scientists based on some criteria. If the current debate over global warming teaches us
anything, it is that scientists and agencies are not without bias. Proponents of the humaneffects theories of global warming accuse scientists expounding natural-effects theories
of selling out to the energy industry. Natural-effects scientists counter-charge that
human-effects advocates are biased by EPA grants, which fund research aimed at proving
human causes of global warming.
Even if we were able to overcome bias in a particular issue area, the science court
reform remains fatally flawed. Thomas Kuhn (1962) explains that science does not
operate by courts or majority rule. In every case of a great discovery, the accumulated
wisdom of science as well as the power of the dons has been arrayed against the genius of
a Newton, a Galileo, or a Curie. Science changes if and only if a new theory explains
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more than the existing theory. The process is extended and it is unlikely that it could be
constrained to bear its fruits within the normal duration of rulemaking. If we accept that
good science might be an advantage to all, we must acknowledge the antithesis that bad
science would be a detriment for all. Science by rule of a majority of a handpicked court
is simply bad science.
A final reform to be considered seeks to return the informal rulemaking process to
the original intent expressed in the APA. William West (2004) describes the evolution of
legal environment of the notice and comment process as it progressed from a method of
getting input to a method of justifying agency decisions.

The framers of the APA viewed rulemaking as an extension of the
legislative process. Much like testimony at committee meetings, public
comment was intended to provide information that administrators could
use as they saw fit. Its advisory role was reflected in the act's 'arbitrary
and capricious' standard of judicial review, which originally was
interpreted as requiring only some reasonable basis for an agency
decision. Since the 1960s, however, many regulatory enabling statutes
(the procedural constraints of which supercede the APA) have required
administrators to justify their policies on the basis of 'substantial evidence'
in the record (p. 67).
Since the 1970s, lower federal courts, and especially the D. C. Circuit, have
sought to protect accountability and participation by subjecting agency rules to a hard
look, originally reserved to the more adversarial formal rulemaking process. While the
Supreme Court has been critical of the lower courts, its own decisions have proven
ambiguous, eschewing the minimal requirements of the APA, and requiring agencies to
justify their policy decisions in a record of the decision process (William West, 2004).
Agencies find themselves in a no-win situation. Bureaucracy is, of necessity,
subject to political accountability, which refers to the ability of Congress and the
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president to control rulemaking activities. Courts require procedural or instrumental
accountability that in turn requires agencies to consider public comment and to produce
rational rules based on the record of information gathered. So, William West (2004)
concludes that:
The tensions between the instrumental accountability that due process
demands and the political accountability demanded of bureaucracy when it
makes general policy decisions suggests that it is desirable to return to the
original conception of public comment as an aid to decision making that
bureaucrats can use at their discretion (p. 67).
As the battle between competing interests, as well as between the constitutional
branches of government, for supremacy in rulemaking has raged, one important idea
seems to have been lost. William West (2004) argues that the goal of rulemaking is to
make accurate rules in accordance with public needs. Access to good information would
facilitate that end. Likewise, a reduction in judicial oversight might actually allow
agencies to exhibit greater flexibility during the notice and comment process. To
accomplish these reforms, Congress would have to modify requirements in numerous
pieces of enabling legislation to coincide with APA requirements and the lower federal
courts would have to abrogate the hard look doctrine that exceeds the APA requirements.
Such changes would not be easy to accomplish, but of all the reforms being
seriously considered, this might have positive results in terms of liberty, equality, and
fairness. Liberty would not be compromised. Any person or group that wished to
participate could do so. Mandatory service on a jury for numerous months or years
would be unnecessary. While equality would not be guaranteed, special interests would
no longer enjoy legal sanctions requiring their voices to be included in agency decisions.
So, as this form of participation becomes less profitable, it would likely be used less by
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the privileged and their lobbyists. That outcome alone would serve to amplify the voices
of any average or disadvantaged citizens who choose to take an interest in a particular
proposal.
Likewise, untangling the web of actors involved in the policy process by limiting
the role of the courts would serve to make all participants more accountable for their
actions and for the outcome of the process. Presently, no individual, agency, legislative
body, or executive can be held accountable because of the virtual certainty of judicial
influence. The agency did or did not do something because a court made it or because it
expected a court would make it do so. So, the only people who might be accountable to
voters conceal themselves behind black robes. Because low-cost political participation,
like voting, is more likely among average and disadvantaged voters, accountability serves
the interest of equality, even if imperfectly.
But, how might returning to the original intent of the APA serve fairness? There
will always be inequality where there is liberty because it is the natural product of
freedom and human nature. Politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests will continue to
dominate the rulemaking process, whatever reforms are accomplished. Perhaps the only
true solace the disadvantaged may hope for is the Second Coming or, even less likely, a
powerful politician who sincerely and selflessly cares about their interests. Until then,
living under laws made by others may be their lot. Living under good laws would be
preferable to living under bad ones. The present system of agency rulemaking virtually
assures that procedural considerations will dominate substantive concerns. Freeing
bureaucrats to make the best possible decision based on the best available information
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and holding them accountable to the elected representatives of the people, as Madison
and his peers designed in the Constitution, may be our best hope for fairness.
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Appendix A

2007 CITIZEN PARTICIPATION SURVEY
According to agency records, you made a comment on the proposed rule
concerning (rule description). The following questions relate to your
experiences in making that comment.
Were you able to get sufficient information
about the subject from government sources?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Did any organization involved in influencing
the outcome of this rulemaking process ask
you to make your comment?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Did you contact any ELECTED OFFICIAL about
this particular issue?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Prior to making this comment, have you ever
made a comment to a proposed agency rule?
_____ Yes _____ No
________________________________________________________________
By what means did you make your comment?
_____ Agency web page

_____ regulations.gov

_____ e-mail

_____ Regular mail
_____ Other
_____ Don't remember
________________________________________________________________
How would you rate the ease
of making your comment?
_____Easy
_____Moderate
_____ Difficult
________________________________________________________________
Many people belong to business, labor, social, professional, and civic
associations or groups that focus on particular issues.
Not counting membership in a local church
or synagogue, are you a member of any of
these kinds of organizations?
_____ Yes _____ No
________________________________________________________________
How many such organizations are you currently a member of? __________
________________________________________________________________
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Many people say that they have less time these days. How about you?
Other than the comment you made on the proposed rule mentioned above,
during the LAST 12 MONTHS, have you done any of the following?
Telephoned, written to, or visited a
government official to express your views?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Attended a community meeting about an
issue facing your community or schools?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Discussed politics with your family or friends?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Listened to political talk radio programs?
_____ Yes _____ No
________________________________________________________________
Next, we need to understand how participation in the rulemaking process
might be related to other types of political activity. The next few questions
relate to various types of political involvement.
During the 2006 ELECTION cycle, did you do any of the following?
Talk to other people and try to show them
why they should vote for or against one of
the parties or candidates?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches,
dinners, or things like that in support of a
particular candidate?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Wear a campaign button, put a campaign
sticker on your car, or place a sign in your
window or in front of your house?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Give money to an INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE
running for public office?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Give money to a POLITICAL PARTY?

_____ Yes

_____ No

Give money to ANY OTHER GROUP that
supported or opposed candidates?
_____ Yes _____ No
________________________________________________________________
Did you vote in the 2006 election?
_____ Yes _____ No
________________________________________________________________
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The next few questions deal with information sources.
During the PAST WEEK, how many days did you do one of the following:
Please circle a number of days
Watch national news on television?

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Watch local news on television?

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Read a daily newspaper?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
________________________________________________________________

Do you have access to the Internet?
_____ Yes _____ No
________________________________________________________________

Please circle the number that best expresses your agreement or disagreement
with the statement.
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

I can trust the government in
Washington, D. C. to do what
is right.

1

2

3

4

5

Government is run by a few
big interests.

1

2

3

4

5

People like me don't have any
say in what government does.

1

2

3

4

5

Elections make government
pay attention to what the people
think.
1
2
3
4
5
________________________________________________________________
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The following section deals with demographic information similar to that
collected in the census. The information you provide will be used
exclusively for academic research and your identity will remain completely
anonymous.
________________________________________________________________
In what year were you born?
__________
________________________________________________________________
What is your present marital status?
_____ Married
_____ Not Married
________________________________________________________________
What is the highest grade of school or
year of college you completed?

_______

(high school graduate = 12, college freshman = 13, 16 = college graduate, etc.)
________________________________________________________________
Are you employed by the federal, state,
or local government?
___ Yes
___ No
________________________________________________________________
Which of the following best describes your annual household income?
___ 0 - $29,999

___ $30,000 - $49,999

___ $50,000 - $79,999

___ $80,000 - $104,999
___ $105,000 - $119,999
___ $120,000 or more
________________________________________________________________
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?
___ Black

___ Asian

___ Native American

___ Hispanic
___ White
___ Other
________________________________________________________________
What is your gender?
___ Female
___ Male
________________________________________________________________
Please place your survey in the envelope provided and mail it today.
Thank you!
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Appendix B
Statistical Tables Not Included in the Text of Chapter 4

Table B.1a
Independent Samples t-Test for Age by Sample
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances

F
Equal
variances
assumed

19.952

Equal
variances
not assumed

Sig.

t-test for Equality of Means

t

95%
Confidence
Degrees of
Sig.
Mean
Std. Error Interval of the
Freedom (2-tailed) Difference Difference
Difference
Lower Upper

.000 4.083

1337

.000

-6.15

1.51

-9.11

-3.2

4.997

195.765

.000

-6.15

1.23

-8.58

-3.72

Table B.1b
Analysis of Variance for Age by CPS Subgroup

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Degrees of
Squares
Freedom
2852.753
3
21505.261
135
24358.014
138

Mean
Square
950.918
159.298

F
Significance
5.969
.001

138
Table B.1c
Dunnett C Multiple Comparisons for Age by CPS Subgroup
Mean Difference
(I-J)
(I) CPS Subgroup (J) CPS Subgroup
Aircraft Over DC
Animal Rights
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Aircraft Over DC Animal Rights
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Re-entry Documents Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Toxic Chemicals
Animal Rights
Toxic Chemicals
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

-5.34
-12.27*
-10.78*
5.34
-6.93
-5.44
12.27*
6.93
1.49
10.78*
5.44
-1.49

Standard
Error

3.29
3.25
3.22
3.29
2.94
2.90
3.25
2.94
2.86
3.22
2.90
2.86

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-14.14
3.46
-21.12
-3.42
-19.56
-2.00
-3.46
14.14
-14.77
.91
-13.20
2.32
3.42
21.12
-.91
14.77
-6.33
9.31
2.00
19.56
-2.32
13.20
-9.31
6.33

Table B.2a
Chi-Square Tests for Marital Status by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
16.554
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1350
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 64.66.

Table B.2b
Chi square Test for Marital Status by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value Freedom
(2-sided)
2.768
3
.429
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.55.
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Table B.3a
Chi-Square Tests for Education Category by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
60.531
2
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1349
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 39.46.

Table B.3b
Chi-Square Test for Education Categories by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
10.795
6
.095
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
Three cells (25.0%) have expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.24.

Table B.4a
Chi-Square Test for Family Income by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
30.332
5
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1202
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.49.

Table B.4b
Chi-Square Test for Family Income by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
7.097
6
.312
Pearson Chi-Square
132
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.27.

140
Table B.5a
Chi-Square Test for White and Non-White by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
27.614
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1340
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.20.

Table B.5b
Chi-Square Test for Race by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
3.594
3
.309
Pearson Chi-Square
136
Number of Valid Cases
4 cells (50.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.65.

Table B.6a
Chi-Square Test for Gender by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value Freedom
(2-sided)
2.906
1
.088
Pearson Chi-Square
1350
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 65.52.

Table B.6b
Chi-Square Test for Gender by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value Freedom
(2-sided)
48.991
3
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
138
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.41.
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Table B.7a
Chi-Square Test for Organization Membership by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
32.980
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1206
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 63.13.

Table B.7b
Chi-Square Test for Organization Membership by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
20.469
3
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
141
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.48.

Table B.8a
Independent Samples t-test for Number of Organizations by Sample
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances

F
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed

33.565

Sig.
.000

t-test for Equality of Means

-5.499

538

.000

-1.34

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower Upper
.24
-1.81
-.86

-3.294

100.452

.001

-1.34

.41

t

Degrees of
Freedom

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

-2.14

-.53
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Table B.8b
Analysis of Variance for Number of Organizations by CPS Subgroup
Sum of
Degrees of
Mean
Squares
Freedom
Square
113.509
3
37.836
1310.112
91
14.397
1423.621
94

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

F

Significance

2.628

.055

Table B.9a
Independent Samples t-Test for Number of Days Watched National News on TV by
Sample
Levene's
Test for
Equality of
Variances
Number of Days
Watched
National News
on TV

F

Sig.

t-test for Equality of Means

t

Standard
Degrees of
Sig.
Mean
Error
Freedom (2-tailed) Difference Difference

95%
Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower Upper

Equal variances
.429 .513 2.211
assumed

1348

.027

-.54

.25 -1.03

.006

2.244

174.103

.026

-.54

.24 -1.02

.007

Equal variances
not assumed

Table B.9b
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Days Watched National News on TV by CPS
Subgroup

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Degrees of
Mean
Squares
Freedom
Square
50.025
3
16.675
972.910
136
7.154
1022.936
139

F
Significance.
2.331
.077
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Table B.10a
Independent Samples t-Test for Number of Days Watched Local News by Sample
Levene's Test
for Equality
of Variances

F
2.658
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed

t-test for Equality of Means
Standard 95% Confidence
Degrees of Significance Mean
Error
Interval of the
Sig.
t
Freedom
(2-tailed) Difference Difference
Difference
Lower Upper
.103 1.988
1347
.047
.49
.25
.0007
.98

2.067

174.874

.040

.49

.24

.002

Table B.10b
Descriptive Statistics for Days Watched Local News by CPS Subgroup
Number
Subgroup
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Total

26
36
39
38
139

Standard Standard 95% Confidence
Mean Deviation Error Interval for Mean Min. Max.
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
4.23
2.45
.48
3.24
5.22
0
7
3.56
2.52
.42
2.70
4.41
0
7
5.03
2.29
.37
4.28
5.77
0
7
3.13
2.92
.47
2.17
4.09
0
7
3.98
2.65
.22
3.53
4.42
0
7

Table B.10c
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Days Watched Local News by CPS Subgroup

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Degrees of
Mean
Squares
Freedom
Square
78.115
3
26.038
888.821
135
6.584
966.935
138

F
3.955

Significance
.010

.96
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Table B.10d
Dunnett C Multiple Comparisons for Days Watched Local News on TV by CPS
Subgroup
Mean
Difference Standard
(I-J)
Error
(I) CPS Subgroup
Animal Rights

(J) CPS Subgroup
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Animal Rights
Re-entry Documents
Aircraft Over DC
Toxic Chemicals
Animal Rights
Toxic Chemicals
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

.68
-.79
1.10
-.68
-1.47
.42
.79
1.47
1.89*
-1.10
-.42
-1.89*

.66
.65
.65
.66
.59
.60
.65
.59
.58
.65
.60
.58

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-1.07
2.42
-2.44
.85
-.74
2.94
-2.42
1.07
-2.97
.003
-1.28
2.13
-.85
2.44
-.003
2.97
.28
3.51
-2.94
.74
-2.13
1.28
-3.51
-.28

Table B.11a
Independent Samples t-Test for Days Read Daily Newspaper by Sample
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances

F
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

1.128

Sig.
.288

t-test for Equality of Means
Degrees
of
Sig. (2Mean
Std. Error
Freedom tailed) Difference Difference

-4.510

1350

.000

-1.15

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper
.26
-1.66
-.65

-4.700

176.602

.000

-1.15

.25

t

-1.64

-.67
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Table B.11b
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Days Read Daily Newspaper by CPS Subgroup

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Degrees of
Mean
Squares Freedom
Square
100.585
3
33.528
938.100
136
6.898
1038.686
139

F
Significance
4.861
.003

Table B.11c
Dunnett C Multiple Comparisons for Days Read Daily Newspaper by CPS Subgroup

(I) CPS Subgroup
Animal Rights

(J) CPS Subgroup
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Re-entry Documents Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Toxic Chemicals
Animal Rights
Toxic Chemicals
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

Mean
Difference Standard
(I-J)
Error
-1.66
.68
-2.31*
.66
-2.23*
.66
1.66
.68
-.65
.61
-.57
.61
2.31*
.66
.65
.61
.008
.59
2.23*
.66
.57
.61
-.008
.59

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-3.46
.15
-4.08
-.54
-3.99
-.47
-.15
3.46
-2.31
1.01
-2.22
1.07
.54
4.08
-1.01
2.31
-1.53
1.69
.47
3.99
-1.07
2.22
-1.69
1.53

Table B.12a
Chi-Square Test for Internet Access by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
40.332
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1207
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 35.86.
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Table B.12b
Chi-Square Test for Internet Access by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
7.542
3
.056
Pearson Chi-Square
Number of Valid Cases
141
4 cells (50.0%) have expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .92.

Table B.13 a
Chi-Square Test for Contact Government Official by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
168.406
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1205
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 37.26.

Table B.13b
Chi-Square Test for Contacting Government Officials by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
9.814
3
.020
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.56.

Table B.14a
Chi-Square Test for Attend Public Meeting by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
13.905
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1203
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 40.26.
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Table B.14b
Chi-Square Test for Attend Public Meeting by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
7.487
3
.058
Pearson Chi-Square
138
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.26.

Table B.15a
Chi-Square Test for Discuss Politics by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value Freedom
(2-sided)
240.935
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1204
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 48.83.

Table B.15b
Chi-Square Test for Discussed Politics by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
6.666
3
.083
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
4 cells (50.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.38.

Table B.16a
Chi-Square Test for Listen to Talk Radio by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
40.406
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1203
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 65.03.
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Table B.16b
Chi-Square Test for Listen to Talk Radio by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
1.676
3
.642
Pearson Chi-Square
137
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.48.

Table B.17a
Chi-Square Test for Try to Influence Voters By Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value Freedom
(2-sided)
11.863
1
.001
Pearson Chi-Square
1205
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 69.10.

Table B.17b
Chi-Square Test for Try to Influence Voters by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
5.148
3
.161
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.63.

Table B.18a
Chi-Square Test for Attend Campaign Meeting by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
23.523
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1205
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.57.
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Table B.18b
Chi-Square Test for Attend Campaign Meeting by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
19.389
3
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
1 cell (12.5%) has an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.83.

Table B.19a
Chi-Square Test for Display Campaign Sign by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
15.145
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1205
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 31.03.

Table B.19b
Chi-Square Test for Display Campaign Sign by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value Freedom
(2-sided)
10.104
3
.018
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.46.

Table B.20a
Chi-Square Tests for Contribute to Candidate by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
63.166
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1205
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.07.
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Table B.20b
Chi-Square Test for Contribute to Candidate by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
15.290
3
.002
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.94.

Table B.21a
Chi-Square Test for Contributions to Party by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
38.312
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1203
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.06.

Table B.21b
Chi-Square Test for Contributions to Party by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value Freedom
(2-sided)
18.689
3
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.56.

Table B.22a
Chi-Square Test for Contribute to Other Group by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
119.689
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
1203
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.31.
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Table B.22b
Chi-Square Test for Contribute to Other Group by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
27.512
3
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
138
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.52.

Table B.23a
Chi-Square Test for Vote by Sample
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
14.098
1
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
676
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.18.

Table B.23b
Chi-Square Test for Vote by CPS Subgroup
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value Freedom
(2-sided)
9.236
3
.026
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
4 cells (50.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.21.
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Table B.24a
Independent Samples Test for People Like Me Don't Have Any Say by Sample
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances
F
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed

15.207

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Degrees of
Sig.
Mean Std. Error Interval of the
Sig.
t
Freedom (2-tailed) Difference Difference Difference
Lower Upper
.000 -4.994
1202
.000
-.56
.11
-.77
-.34

-5.405

185.203

.000

-.56

.10

-.76

Table B.24b
One-Way Analysis of Variance for People Like Me Don't Have Any Say by CPS
Subgroup

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Degrees of
Mean
Squares
Freedom
Square
9.493
3
3.164
164.791
135
1.221
174.284
138

F
2.592

Significance
.055

-.35

153
Table B.25a
Independent Samples Test for Elections Make Government Pay Attention by Sample
Levene's Test
for Equality
of Variances

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Degrees of
Sig.
Mean
Std. Error Interval of the
Difference
F
Sig.
t
Freedom (2-tailed) Difference Difference
Lower Upper
18.462 .000 -6.307
1202
.000
-.71
.11
-.92
-.49

-7.049

193.288

.000

-.71

.10

-.90

-.51

Table B.25b
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Elections Make Government Pay Attention by CPS
Subgroup
Sum of
Degrees of
Squares
Freedom
1.454
3
166.305
137
167.759
140

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Mean
Square
.485
1.214

F
.399

Significance
.754

Table B.26a
Independent Samples Test for Government Run by a Few Big Interests by Sample
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

F
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed

879.640

Sig.
.000

t-test for Equality of Means
Standard 95% Confidence
Interval of the
Degrees of
Sig.
Mean
Error
t
Freedom (2-tailed) Difference Difference Difference
Lower Upper
2.207
1164
.028
.37
.17
.004
.71

3.380

285.713

.001

.37

.11

.16

.59
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Table B.26b
One-Way Analysis of Variance for Government Run by a Few Big Interests by CPS
Subgroup

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Degrees of
Mean
Squares
freedom
Square
22.977
3
7.659
143.761
137
1.049
166.738
140

F
Significance
7.299
.000

Table B.26 c
Dunnett C Multiple Comparisons for Government Run by a Few Big Interests by CPS
Subgroup
Mean Difference Standard
(I-J)
Error
(I) CPS Subgroup
Animal Rights

(J) CPS Subgroup
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
Toxic Chemicals
Re-entry Documents Animal Rights
Aircraft Over DC
Toxic Chemicals
Animal Rights
Toxic Chemicals
Aircraft Over DC
Re-entry Documents
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

-.55
.008
.55
.55
.63
1.10*
.008
-.63
.47
-.55
-1.10*
-.47

.26
.26
.26
.26
.24
.24
.26
.24
.23
.26
.24
.23

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-1.32
.21
-.64
.79
-.14
1.23
-.21
1.32
.005
1.31
.46
1.74
-.79
.64
-1.31
.005
-.11
1.04
-1.23
.14
-1.74
-.46
-1.04
.11
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Appendix C
Statistical Tables Not Included in the Text of Chapter 5

Table C.1
Chi-Square Test for Get Information From Government
Degrees of
Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
19.655
3
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
125
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.40.

Table C.2
Chi-Square Test for Organization Ask You to Make Comment
Degrees of
Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
52.384
3
.000
Pearson Chi-Square
137
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.82

Table C.3
Chi-Square Test for Contact Elected Official About Issue
Degrees of
Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
4.308
3
.230
Pearson Chi-Square
137
N of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.63.
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Table C.4
Chi-Square Test for Made Previous Comments
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
13.440
3
.004
Pearson Chi-Square
139
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.29.

Table C.5
Chi-Square Test for Same or Different Issue
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
11.092
3
.011
Pearson Chi-Square
102
Number of Valid Cases
1 cell (12.5%) has an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.43.

Table C.6
Chi-square Test for Comment Made Via Internet
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
3.276
3
.351
Pearson Chi-Square
141
Number of Valid Cases
0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.16.

Table C.7
Chi-Square Test for Ease of Making Comment
Degrees of Asymp. Sig.
Value
Freedom
(2-sided)
6.385
6
.381
Pearson Chi-Square
141
Number of Valid Cases
4 cells (33.3%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37.

